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PREFACE 
This report is an MA ( "doctoraal") thesis submitted to the department of philosophy, university of 
Amsterdam. It attempts to answer the question whether machines can think by conceptual analysis. 
Ideally, a conceptual analysis should give plausible explications of the concepts of "machine" and "intelli-
gence" and then investigate the intersection of the sets of entities defined b; these explications. If the 
intersection is empty and the a priori argument is correct (or plausible), then empirical research into 
machine intelligence will (plausibly) not result in an intelligent machine. On the other hand, if conceptual 
analysis cannot show the intersection to be empty, it remains an empirical (or rather, technical) question 
whether such machines can actually be constructed. 
Such a neat argument cannot be produced, however, due to the vagueness of the concept of intelli-
gence. It is quite possible to provide a rather uncontroversial explication of the concept of machine. Exist-
ing controversy about the possibility of machine intelligence is about the nature of intelligence, not about 
the nature of machines. Indeed, if intelligence could be unambiguously defined, we could (in principle; 
build a machine to implement it. Those who believe that intelligence cannot be realized in a machine, can-
not base their arguments on an explicit and uncontroversial analysis of the concept of intelligence. 
The argument in this essay therefore follows a different route than the ideal argument. After a defin-
ition of machine which combines the important characteristics of that concept in computer science and sys-
tems theory, I try to explicate why we think this definition captures our informal intuitions about the 
nature of machine-like, mechanical processes adequately. This leads to an explication of what explicitly 
described processes are. 
Chapter 2 then replaces the question whether machines can think by the s1mpler question whether 
machines can explicate. Using the explication of the concept of explicit descriptions given in chapter 1, I 
argue that the process of explication cannot be explicitly described. If that argument is correct (or plausi-
ble), then no machine can (plausibly) be built which explicates a situation, for to build a machine is to 
implement an explicit description. The bearing on the original question of machine intelligence is this: If 
human intelligence presupposes the ability to explicate, an entity which cannot explicate cann€>t have 
human intelligence. Chapter 2 contains some arguments why we do not attribute human intelligence to a 
being which cannot explicate. 
In chapter 3 the argument is defended against some possible counterar~wments and compared with 
two well-known criticisms of artificial intelligence, those by Dreyfus and Searle. Finally, chapter 4 
explores some practical as well as metaphysical consequences of the thesis. 
This short overview of the argument should already have made clear that I do not believe that an uncontr-
oversial, explicit proof of the impossibility of machine intelligence exists. If such a proof existed, it could 
be automated, which would be close to a refutation of what the proof would establish. It follows that holes 
can be shot in the argument. It won't execute without errurs in all environmc •.. ,. Therefore, in the interest 
of (among other tttings) brevity, I stopped explicating when further explication would backfire and merely 
expose the emptiness of the argument. That -the empty argument- would have been, as Isshuu Miura said, 
closer to the truth than the essay I wrote now. But then, I wouldn't have passed the exam by handing in an 
empty paper. 
Working on this thesis made me painfully aware that the semantic network we live in is essentially fluid 
and unbounded. Thanks are due to my supervisor Hans Swart, who followc:J me on my wanderings in 
various interesting directions and who suggested I stay with one topic and work that out. Thanks are also 
due to Dick de Jongh and Loet Leydesdorff, who gave constructive criticisms of the thesis. 
Amsterdam, june 25, 1987 
R.J.W. 
The movements start from the abdominal parts and the 
breath passing through the teeth produces various sounds. 
When articulated they linguistically make sense. Thus we 
clearly realize that they are unsubstantial. Rinzai (Lin-Chi 
d. 867) in: D.T. Suzuki [1960], p. 42. 
Of course, what I have been saying all this while is just a 
part of the confusion of sounds of wich the world is so full. 
Isshuu Miura in: Miura & Sasaki [1965], p. 45. 
Actually, the task of capturing the meaning of data is a 
never-ending one. T. Codd [1979], p. 398. 
Chapter 1 
Machines and explicitness 
The concept of a machine has been explicated in automata theory (Minsky [1967]), the theory of 
formal languages (Hopcroft & Ullman [1969]), and the foundations of mathematics (Davis 
[1958]). The explication given in this chapter follows Minsky and starts from the concept of a 
system. 
1.1. Systems, states, and processes 
A system is any part of reality we are interested in and of which we can indicate the boundaries. 
The system boundaries distinguish the system from its environment, which interests us only in 
so far as it affects the system or is affected by the system. The influence of the environment on 
the system is called the system input, and the influence of the system on its environment is 
called the system output. I use the term "external influence" as synonymous with "system 
input" and "system behavior" as synonymous with "system output." 
When we direct our attention toward a system of which we cannot observe the internal 
structure, we are limited to observing the history of inputs to and outputs of the system. Sup-
pose H 1l(t) and H 2(t) are two possible histories of the system at time r. Then the system can 
distinguish between them iff there is a possible sequence of inputs after t which would lead to 
one output sequence for H 1 and a different output sequence for H 2 • The system cannot distin-
guish between H 1(t) and H2(t) iff 1 for every possible future input sequence the same output 
sequence would ensue when that sequence follows H 1 (t) as when it follows H 2(t). 
It is easy to see that indistinguishability of histories is an equivalence relation. It is reflex-
ive, symetric and transitive. We can therefore partition the set of all possible histories at time t 
in an exhaustive and disjoint set of equivalence classes. The equivalence class of the history at 
timet is called the state of the system at timet (cf. Minsky [1965], pp. 11 ff.). Giving the state 
at time t is to give structural information about the system, for it captures exactly what it is 
about the internal configuration of the system that makes a difference for future behavior. The 
state of a system is a memory of previous events, since it contains information about the history 
of the system. It contains exactly the information which is relevant to every possible futures of 
the system. 
A process is a sequence of states. When a system goes through a process, it carries out or 
executes the process. I will use the two terms "go through" and "carry out" as synonymous in 
this context. Note that a process is a sequence of states, not of inputs and outputs. A system 
may receive no input and produce no output for some time and still carry out a process, i.e. 
change state. The concept of state puts us beyond behaviorism. 
Up till now, the system has been treated as a black box. If we were to open it, we could 
use the pattern of state transitions of the system to identify subsystems. The state of the system 
may then be decomposed into the state of its subsystems plus a summation rule such that each 
subsystem goes through a process of its own, with respect to which the rest of the system acts as 
an environment. For example, a copper wire may be considered as consisting of a series of 
resistors such that its resistance, which is a quantity characterising part of its state, is the sum of 
the resistances of the parts. Or a gas may be considered to consist of particles such that the 
quantities characterising its state are related to that states of the particles in a statistical way. 
It is important to see that in each of these cases the subsystems can be treated in exactly 
the same way as the whole system: Without looking at or even knowing their internal structure, 
they can be described as going through a sequence of states, displaying behavior, subject to 
environmental conditions. Much of science progresses in this top-down manner. 
I. If and only if. 
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If a system -can be quantitavely described, its states can be characterised by a set of 
numbers which are values of its state variables. State variables change during a process and 
stand in certain relations to each other. If the system is divided into subsystems, its state vari-
ables also stand in relations to the state variables of its subsystems. The name of a state variable 
intuitively indicates the role it plays in the state changes of the system. The definition of a state 
variable is functional, i.e. it indicates the function which the variable has in the determination 
of the next state. 
The number of state variables of a system is called its dimension. The state veriables 
define a state space in which coordinate axes can be defined corresponding to each state vari-
able. Any process which the system goes through can be visualised as a path through the state 
space. Some system are infinite-dimensional. For example, when a piece of metal is magnetised, 
the next degree of magnetisation is dependent not only on the current degree of magnetisation 
and current input, but on the whole history of magnetisation and the current input. Because 
magnetisation is a continuous process, infinitely many numbers are needed to determine the 
next state of the system. The state space is therefore infinite-dimensional. 
For every system we can try to find the state transition function, which determines the next 
state and output from the current state and input. Systems can be classified according to the type 
of state transition function they have. The most important distinction is that between continuous 
systems, which have a continuous next state function, and discrete systems, which have a 
discrete transition function. This difference concerns the kind of mathematics used to do next 
state computations, continuous or discrete. I will talk of state evolution when I want to leave 
open whether I am talking about continuous or discrete systems, and about state transitions 
when I am talking about discrete systems only. 
Another division distinguishes deterministic systems, which have a deterministic state tran-
sition function, i.e. a function which assigns one next state to every current input & state, from 
nondeterministic systems, which have a nondeterministic next-state function, i.e a function which 
assigns a set of next states. A special kind of nondeterministic systems are probabilistic systems, 
whose next-state function is non-deterministic and gives the probability of each state in the 
next-state set. 
In the sequel, the distinctions between discrete, continuous, deterministic, non-
deterministic and probabilistic systems play no role. I mentioned them only to draw attention to 
the fact that if my argument is valid, it is valid for all these systems. It is irrelevant whether we 
are talking about computers, connection machines, Boltzmann machines, neural networks, mas-
sively parrallel architectures, or any other type of machine, as long as it is a machine. 
1.2. Machines, Turing machines, computers. 
A machine is a system for which there is a state evolution function. Put this way, the concept of 
a machine does not seem very helpful, since according to it there may be systems of which there 
is a state evolution function which is unknown to us. There is a state evolution function of such 
systems, but we don't know it. 
However, this definition of -"machine" agrees with the usage in modern science. 2 Scien-
tific research is aimed at discovering which systems found in nature are machines and it shows 
that they are machines by producing state evolution functions of them which fit observable 
The assumption that a system is a machine is a justification for the rationality of scientific research, but must 
itself be justified by the results of scientific research. This is a kind of hermeneutical circle which is broken 
by investigating systems which "look promising." The assumption that nature is a machine is the distinguish-
ing characteristic of modern, i.e. post-Newtonian, science. Dijksterhuis concludes his [1961] as follows: 
"In those days [the 17th century] an entirely new standpoint towards nature has been reached: 'substantial' 
thinking. which inquired about the nature of things, had to be exchanged for 'functional' thinking, which 
wanted to ascertain the behaviour of things in their interdependence; the treatment of natural phenomena 
in words had to be abandoned in favour of a mathematical formulation of the relations between them.·· 
(p. 501) 
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behavior. It produces them in the sense that Johnny pro-duces a dinky toy from his pocket. If a 
system is a machine after scientists find a fitting state evolution function for it, it was a machine 
before they found it. Questions about the ontological status of universals aside, we can capture 
the gist of the concept of a machine by saying that a machine is a system for which there is a 
state evolution function. 
The question whether a system is a machine thus reduces to the question whether there is a 
state evolution function of that system, and we can give a positive answer to that question by 
producing such a function. Put differently, to be a machine is to be describable as a machine. 
This definition does not exclude things which any definition of "machine" should include, 
e.g. radios, cars, computers and airplanes. It also includes natural systems we know how to 
describe as a machine, such as the solar system, a falling stone, subnuclear particles (to a cer-
tain extent) and even man. 
To substantiate this last example, consider a library information system in which the user's 
actions are: To borrow a book, to return a book, to lose a book, to pay for a book, to extend a 
loan, and to request a book. A simple finite-state transition diagram can be drawn in which 
these actions figure as state transitions. Under this description, the user is a machine. Needless 
to say, this description does not describe his 3 intelligence. Moreover, similar descriptions can 
be given of the books in the library, which thereby are machines as well. 
The definition of machines thus includes things which we would not regard as machines at 
first sight, even though we describe them as machines. On the other hand, it excludes systems of 
which we can reasonably say that they are not machines. The weather, two people talking to 
each other, a writer writing a novel, the processes reported to go on during the !Kung Bushmen 
healing dance (Katz [1982]), hopping during transcendental meditation, and subnuclear "parti-
cles" whose behavior is dimly understood are not machines. And if we find a fitting description 
of the evolution any of these systems, our intuitions about that system would probably change in 
such a way that we regard it henceforth as a machine. This is extra evidence that the definition 
in the first section of this section adequately explicates our intuitions. 
Scientists attempt to describe some of these dimly understood systems as machines while 
others are written off, without argument (at least not with an argument with the size of this 
essay), as not explicitly describable by a state evolution function. Often, even the reports about 
the existence of such processes are doubted. But we may try to show of any dimly understood 
process that it is not a machine by showing on a priori grounds that there cannot exist a state 
evolution function of it. The conceptual analysis must then use the essential characteristic of the 
concept of a state to show that that concept is not applicable to the process in question. This 
thesis tries to give such an argument for one type of process, explication. 
The examples and counter-examples given so far concern only concrete machines. Exam-
ples of abstract machines are the finite-state automata, push-down store machines, linear-
bounded automata and Turing machines of abstract automata theory. Every computer program 
is an abstract machine, which is simulated by a concrete computer. These examples emphasize 
that a machine is a conceptualization. Concrete machines such as a radio or the solar system 
exist independently of us, but we cannot call them machines when we do not have a description 
of their state evolution function. 
An interesting consequence of this account is that a broken-down radio is not a machine. It 
is a system of which we don't know the state evolution function. It behaves erratically. In that 
case, we use the state evolution function of a functioning radio as a reference point against 
which to measure the performance of the broken radio. Repairing the broken radio is making it 
function according to that state evolution function. It is the state evolution function which is the 
heart of the machine, not the hunk of metal and plastic emmitting sounds on command. 
This procedure contrasts with that of natural science, where in case of a persistent and 
important conflict between description and behavior, we try to fix the description, not the 
3. "His" abbreviates "his or her." 
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system. The library user borrowing a book and then refusing to execute any of the actions of the 
relevant finite-state transition diagram, acts like a broken radio and is acted upon in the same 
way: External force is used to make him behave properly. 
One class of machines, Turing machines, plays a central role in discussions about MI. 
Some terminology pertaining to this class is briefly reviewed below. Very little of this will play 
a role in the rest of this essay, and I mention it, as before, to point out that my argument applies 
to all these different types of machines. 
A Turing machine (TM) is a discrete system with two components, one of which can be in a 
finite number of states, and the other of which is a tape consisting of an infinite number o_f 
squares, each of which can store one symbol from a finite alphabet. The tape plays the role both 
of the system environment and of extra memory (in addition to the memory provided by the 
states). The finite-state machine and tape communicate via a read/write head. The TM is started 
with the head scanning one square. The state transition function defines, for every current state 
and scanned symbol, the next state, the symbol to write on the current square, and whether to 
move one square to the right or left. 
The Turing-Church thesis (TC) says that a TM can be used to model any computation 
which can be carried out by symbol manipulation. One way to see this is that every symbol 
manipulation process carried out by man consists of a series of replacements of (sequences of) 
symbols by (sequences of) symbols written on a medium, e.g. paper. A TM does just that, not 
hampered by lack of paper, ink, time, or energy and not plagued by fatigue, illness, untimely 
death, various distractions, infatuation, anger, or boredom. 
The TC thesis is a thesis which is well-argued but not proved. Whenever intuitive concepts 
are formalized by exact concepts, the question whether the formal concept exactly covers the 
intuitive concept cannot be settled by proof. Proofs start with definitions, and cannot justify that 
the definitions proofs start with explicate our informal intuitions "correctly." One can give argu-
ments· by conceptual analysis and by pointing out successes of the definition (e.g. the conse-
quences which follow from the definition are intuitively satisfying), but there is always room for 
disagreement. 
A universal TM (UTM) is a TM such that, given a description of the transition function of 
any TM in a certain format on its tape, and the initial configuration of the tape of that TM, it 
simulates rhe process the TM would go through (to simulate one state transition of the TM; it 
goes through several transitions itself). The description of the TM on the tape of a UTM is 
called a TM program. 
In the world of computers, different, but for our purposes synonymous, terminology is 
used. A TM is there called a special purpose digital computer and a UTM is called a general 
purpose digital computer, or simply computer. A TM program is called a computer program or 
simply program. For most purposes we can use the terms "program" and "TM" interchangably. 
By treating a computer as an (abstract) UTM, we disregard space- and time bounds of the 
concrete machine. The tape of the UTM is the computer's memory, the finite-state part of the 
UTM is the computer's central processing unit (CPU). This abstraction from the concrete 
machine proved to provide better understanding of what a computer does than modelling by 
another type of abstract machine. 
The machines defined thus far are deterministic. Non-deterministic and probabilistic ver-
sions exist as well. 
Finally, a special purpose continuous computer is a deterministic continuous system. These 
are usually called analog computers. To the concept of a general purpose digital computer 
corresponds a general purpose continuous computer, a machine which simulates the (continu-
ous) processes which any continuous deterministic system can go through. In practice, continu-
ous general purpose computers are never built because reliable continuous memories, which 
should be able to store and distinguish among an infinite set of symbols ( eg. a set of real 
numbers) are extremely difficult to construct (see eg. Hollingdale & Tootill [1965], p.72). 
Moreover, special purpose continuous computers can be simulated by general purpose digital 
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computers to arbitrary high precision, so we do not need a general purpose continuous computer 
to play the role of universal machine in the continuous realm. 
1.3. Explicit descriptions 
In the previous section I defined machines as systems whose behavior is described by a state 
evolution or -transition function. In this section I want to investigate three properties of these 
descriptions which will play a role in the argument of chapter 2. It will be argued there that 
explication is a process which cannot be described by a description having any of these three 
processes. 
The three properties are repeatability, context-independence, and communicability. I will 
call descriptions which have those properties explicit descriptions. 
A process is repeatable if it develops in the same way whenever the same state occurs, fol-
lowed by the same sequence of inputs. For example, any TM will go through the same state 
changes whenever initialized with the same input on its tape and started in the same state. Simi-
larly, if at times t 0 and t 1 the solar system passes through the same state and following t 0 and t 1 
the same sequence of inputs follows, it will go through the same state evolution. This simpy fol-
lows from the definition of·the concept of a state. The use of the word "same" is crucial here. 
TM's go through the same state changes by definition and the solar system by causes outside our 
control, but in both cases there is a notion of "the same state" which warrants use of the notion 
"the same state sequence" = "the same process." The notion of "the same state" consists of cer-
tain state descriptions being applicable at different places and moments. 4 
The use of the word "same" thus emphasises the conceptual nature of machines. Machines 
exist independently of us, but they are only machines under a descri~tion. For example, at a 
suitable level of abstraction, the solar system is a machine, but at a higher level of detail the 
processes become chaotic, i.e. they are subject to random fluctuations or their pattern is simply 
unknown. As another example, a library user is a -system executing different processes con-
currently, at least one of which, his behavior as a library user, can be explicitly described. At 
suitable levels of abstraction, some of the other processes can be described as machines as well, 
but when we get down to lower levels of detail, the processes which we describe lose their 
characteristic of repeatability. The repeatability of the process corresponds to the repeatable 
applicability of the process description and I will often losely speak of "repeatable process 
description," where I should speak of "repeatably applicable process description." 
The second characteristic of explicit descriptions is context-independence. If a process is 
repeatable, its description is context-free in the sense that the influence of the environment on 
its state evolution is specified exhaustively. A system may execute more than one process con-
currently (e.g., my body is executing many processes at once) or it may be described in many 
different ways as executing one process at different levels of abstraction, but given a description 
at a certain level of abstraction in the form of a state evolution function, the effects of the 
environment upon the described process is exhaustively specified. By implication, what is not 
specified in it, has no influence upon the evolution of the process at that level of abstraction. 
Placed in a context which satisfies the properties required by the state evolution function but 
different in any other property, the system will execute the same process. 
The third characteristic of explicit descriptions is that they are communicable. A repeatable 
process must be identifiable as the same process every time it occurs. In whatever way this iden-
tification takes place, a group of people must agree that the process is identified and must know 
the process by its identification. In other words, the process description is communicable to 
members of a group who can apply it, i.e. use it to identify a process. This group is not limited 
by vagaries of birth, status, culture or race, but by its competence to understand and apply the 
process description. Verification that a member of this group posseses this competence is done 
4. This account can be adapted for non-deterministic and probabilistic cases by replacing ··state .. by "set of 
states" or "set of states with a probability distribution," respectively. 
- 6-
by other members of the group, who must be competent themselves as well. The most common 
institution where this happens is in our schools and universities. Apart from these tests of com-
petence, the group of competent people throws up no barriers to aspiring members. There may 
be other barriers, such as an aspiring member not being able to learn how to apply the process 
descriptions, or the admission fee to the institution of learning being exhorbitantly high, or the 
government instituting a bizarre lottery system to decide who is going to be allowed to join a 
school or university. But in all cases, the requirement of applicability of the description by dif-
ferent people ensures that the description does not refer to properties of the person who applies 
it. 
In short, an explicit description is applicable in different contexts by different people to a 
system which does not depend upon the idiosyncracies of the human being who liappens to 
apply the description. No intuition is required to apply it, since all relevant aspects of the con-
texts are mentioned in it. In the case of abstract machines like TM's, applicability by any person 
is ensured by making the parts of the description as simple as possible (but the total description 
may be very complicated). 
Every machine is an explicitly described system. The converse may be true as well, i.e. 
every system executing an explicitly described process is a machine, but that is not of impor-
tance to my thesis. My argument is that a machine cannot explicate because explication cannot 
explicitly described. If a machine is an explicitly described system, then if explication cannot be 
explicitly described, explication cannot be carried out by machine. 
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Chapter 2 
The mechanization of explication 
The second half of the answer to the question whether machines can think should ideally consist 
of an explication of the concept of intelligence. Due to the vagueness of that concept, this is not 
possible in an uncontroversial way. One way to circumvent this problem is to replace the ques-
tion whether machines can think by the question how we could find out whether machines are 
intelligent. Turing [1950] did this in his famous test. The Turing test (TT) has been the stage for 
discussions about the possibility of MI ever since and is discussed in section 2.1. Section 2.2 cri-
ticizes the validity of the test as a correct way of settling the answer to the question whether 
machines can think. This criticism is also a motivation for the structure of my own argument, 
which is then presented in sections 2.3 and 2.4. Section 2.5 clears a possible misunderstanding 
about what is actually argued in the foregoing sections. 
2.1. The Turing test 
There are four versions of the TT. 
In the first version ( TT 1) an interrogator, C, is connected by a data communication line to 
two people A and B with a terminal (a keyboard and a video screen). He has to find out, by 
asking questions to either one and by reading the answers, which of the other two is the man 
and which is the woman. A, B, and C can each see what the others type in. Now, without 
knowledge of the interviewer, A is replaced by a machine designed to answer questions in 
natural language. Turing proposes to replace the question "Can machines think?" by the ques-
tion "Will the interrogator decide wrongly who is a man and who is a woman as often in the 
case that A is a machine as in the case that A and B are both human beings?" 
Version two of the test, TT2 , is the one usually discussed by philosophers. In IT2 C knows 
that either A or B is a machine and is to decide who is the machine and who is the human 
being. 
In version three, TT3, specialists compare, in a peer review, the performance of a group of 
specialists in their area. Without their knowing it, among the group to be judged there is a 
machine built to perform on a specialist level. The test is to see if the machine is judged signifi-
cantly different from human specialists. The MYCIN expert system was subjected to this test 
(Yu eta!. [1984]). 
In TT4 the performance of the specialist machine is compared with that of human special-
ists to see if it significantly differs from them. MYCIN was subjected to this test as well (Yu et 
a!. [1979]), before it was recognized that TT 3 is more fair to the machine. 1 
The last two tests are versions of the first two in the domain of expert systems and are not 
relevant to the discussion in this essay. The first two are relevant, so we have to see if there is 
any difference between the two and if so, which is the "correct" one. 
TT 1 is designed to test whether we can make machines perform in such a way that we do 
not need to know whether we are interacting with a person or a machine. The hypothesis 
whether A is a machine does not enter C's mind, unless during the interview an explicit reason 
arises which forces him to do so. Under the circumstances of TT 1 , the hypothesis does not cross 
C's mind, because it is too absurd in everyday conversation to take the idea seriously. If some-
one does find it necessary to proceed with a conversation upon the explicit assumption that the 
other is a machine, we gently suggest mental treatment ( cf. Robinson [1972]). Because C does 
not know that he has to decide whether he is talking to a machine or a human being, he does 
not have to explicate any of his assumptions about the behavior of human beings either. This 
I. On the other hand, TT4 is fairer to the prospective buyer of the machine. who wants it to clearly outper-
form its human counterparts. 
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has two advantages. First, the instructions to C do not have to mention any suppposed differ-
ence between man and machine. This is consistent with either outcome of the test. Second, the 
test can be described and judged without having to mention distinguishing characteristics of 
human intelligence (which the machine playing the role of A is or is not going to display). 
Instead, C uses his implicit, unexplicated knowledge of what it is to behave with human intelli-
gence. That way, the test can be discussed before we can actually build a machine to play the 
role of A. 
In TT 2 , the situation is very different. C will now use some of his (right or wrong) ideas 
about what the crucial difference(s) between man and machine are. This is harder on the 
machine, since we now test, not whether we can fool C, but whether C can detect any differ-
ence between the behavior of the human being and machine he is interviewing. For example, 
when A starts uttering gibberish, C will decide that A is a machine and that its language gen-
erating routine has broken down. In the case of TT 1, C would have assumed that A is a 
foreigner switching to his own language, or is banging his fist on the keyboard, or that the com-
munication line has broken down or anything but the hypothesis that A is a machine. Since B 
and C can be any person, IT2 tests whether the machine A behaves indistinguishable from any 
person for any observer. For an interviewer who knows that one of the rooms contains a 
machine and the other a human being, the (linguistic) behavior of a machine passing TT2 is 
indistinguishable from that of a human being, while a machine which passes TT 1 could still 
display behavior which in TT 2 would be distinguishable from that of human beings. Whereas 
TT 1 is a test of C (viz. whether we can fool him), TT2 is a test of A (viz. whether it behaves 
indistinguishably from a human being). From this comparison I conclude that TT2 is the right 
explication of the test. When in the following I refer to TT, I mean TT 2 . 
We can explicate the TT semiformally as the following definition. 
A is intelligent:= vB,C E persons [C cannot distinguish A and B's behavior] (*) 
The definition is semiformal because the concepts of person and indistinguishable behavior are 
not defined formally (and, as this thesis implies, cannot defined formally). 
AI enthusiasts sometimes forget the quantifier on C and claim intelligence for a system 
which could fool one interviewer (for some of the time). But if we view (*) as an operational 
definition of "intelligence," we must include the quantifier on C. Similarly, it is essential to the 
definition that we cannot in advance single out a class of human beings distinguishable from 
machines and restrict quantification on B to those we cannot distinguish from machines. 
Two other essential elements of the definition are indistinguishability and behavior. Which 
behavior do we look at, and when are two instances of those behaviors indistinguishable? As 
regards the first question, remember that any library user is a machine under a certain, very 
abstract, description. At that level of abstraction, we don't need a TT to decide whether there is 
a machine which thinks, for every library user is one. Neither do we need the level of detail at 
which the behavior of individual neurons is described, for then C's role as a supplier of intuitive 
judgements of indistinguishability would be superfluous. 2 The second question, when two 
behaviors are to count as indistinguishable, must be decided on intuitive grounds. Plainly, no 
two behaviors are exactly indistinguishable. In physics, where explicitly described behavior is 
2. There is an interesting analogon between the TT extended to the level of neurons and the sorites paradox. 
Compare: 
One grain of sand is not a sandheap. 
If n grains of sand are not a sandheap, n + 1 grains of sand are not a sandheap either. 
(By induction on n :) Vn E IN [n grains of sand are not a sandheap]. 
If one neuron of a person Pis replaced by a machine with indistinguishable behavior, P still thinks. 
If P thinks after n neurons have been replaced, then P still thinks after n + l neurons 'have been replaced. 
P thinks after all his neurons have been replaced. 
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measured quantitavely, use is made of an elaborate theory of measurement errors and sampling 
in order to average out individual but insignificant differences between different behaviors. If 
we had measurements to which such a theory could be applied in the case of the behavior 
relevant to the TT, then the TT, and C's role in it as a supplier of intuitive judgements, would 
be superfluous. I conclude that the relevant behavior is the type of behavior with which a 
human being intuitively feels at home and that indistinguishability is defined with respect to this 
intuition. 
The TT has now been explicated as a test in which any interviewer cannot intuitively dis-
tinguish the (linguistic) behavior of any person from that of a machine. 
2.2. Assumptions of the Turing test 
I think the TT is attractive to many people because it makes two misleading (and related) mis-
takes: 
1. The question whether a machine can actually be constructed to pass the test is taken out of 
the conceptual realm of a priori arguments. In the hands of Turing, it becomes not even an 
empirical question but a technical one. This creates an open atmosphere in which research-
ers are not bridled by dogmas or ideologies fixed by church or state and have the freedom 
to say "Let's try it. Some day we may succeed." ( cf. Turing [1950], p. 23). This appeals to 
our sense of freedom of mind. 3 
2. When we want to give arguments why an entity is intelligent, we are ultimately led back to 
observable behavior. If we want to deny intelligence to a machine which behaves indistin-
guishably from a human being, then we should deny intelligence to the human being as 
well (Turing [1950], p. 17). This appeals to our sense of intellectual honesty: Once we 
have decided to be open-minded, we should be willing to support our statements by argu-
ments and our arguments by facts, and in this we should not give favors to one party. 
These two moves in the argument are mistaken because they distract the discussion about the 
question of MI from the real issue. First, the question whether machines can think is a concep-
tual one. The shift of attention from "what is intelligence" to " how do we know that X is intel-
ligent?" is inappropriate. It has been repeatedly asserted by different authors (Robinson [1972], 
Searle [1980a & b]) that the ·issue is not how we know that people are intelligent, nor whether 
we can give arguments for the statement that someone has human intelligence, but what it is we 
attribute to a human being when we attribute normal human intelligence to him or her. We may 
be mistaken in the attribution, or we may give incorrect arguments in support of a correct attri-
bution, but the elucidation of what it is we attribute can be carried our independently of the 
investigation of when we are mistaken and of examination of the kind of arguments we give in 
support of the attribution. From this it follows that the first move made by the TT can be coun-
tered by noting that the last two questions (when are we mistaken in the attribution of intelli-
gence and what kind of (right or wrong) arguments do we give in support of it) are empirical 
but that the first, elucidation of what it is we attribute, is conceptual. The same observation also 
counters the second move. We are not asking how we know that other beings are intelligent, we 
are asking what intelligence is. If we can give a plausible explication of the concept of intelli-
gence as applied to human beings, we may find that it is the kind of property which cannot logi-
cally (or plausibly, depending upon the hardness of the argument) be attributed to a machine. 
Viewed in this way, the TT tests whether we are mistaken in the attribution of human intelli-
gence. 
This point is not generally appreciated in the AI community. For example, Minsky [1982] 
predicts that with the advent of smarter machines, the meaning of "intelligence" will evolve 
3. Some believers in the possibility of MI say that the unbelievers ought to sh~H\ more humility and admit of 
the possibility that there are intelligent machines, that these can -*gasp*- even be more intelligent than human 
beings. This appeals to a sense of freedom of mind and a room for. bold ideas. An equally emotional argu-
ment from the other side is that one ought not to try to imitate God and create beings who may have a soul. 
These discussions regress into insinuations about each other's lack of openness of mind or religiosity. 
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until it is appropriate to apply it to machines as well as to people. This ignores the possibility 
that the meaning of "intelligence" as it is currently used may contain a valid distinction between 
man and machine ( cf. Robinson [1972]). If there is, it can only be uncovered by conceptual 
analysis. It can also get blurred by a shift in meaning of "intelligence," but in that case we 
would have to find a new term to indicate the distinction. What is at issue is whether the distinc-
tion is valid. Note that, curiously, appeal to a shift in meaning of the word "intelligence" is a 
reversion of the movement from the conceptual to the technical realm. It is merely a conceptual 
matter whether machines can be intelligent, Minksy says, and we should have the openness of 
mind to go through this change. 
The confusion of the question what huma_n intelligence is with the question how we know 
that someone has human intelligence did not start with Turing's original article. Jefferson, to 
whose Lister oration Turing responded, traces the opinion to Descartes: 
If, [Descartes says] one had a machine that had the shape and appearance of a mon-
key or other animal without a reasoning soul (i.e. without a human mind) there 
would be no means of knowing which was the counterfeit. (Jefferson [1949], p. 1106) 
Descartes said it is possible to produce such a counterfeit of an animal but not for man, 
since man has a mind. Having a mind is the essential difference in the Cartesian dualis-
tic universe between man and the rest of the world. Turing wrote his article to deny the 
impossibility of constructing a counterfeit human being. If we have such a counterfeit 
human being, Turing says, we must view it simply as a human being because it is a 
human being. I argue against this that it is impossible to produce a counterfeit human 
being (and perhaps of other animals as well) without assuming a dualist metaphysics. 
The argument in section 2.4 against. the possible existence of intelligent machines does 
not require the assumption that any intelligent being must have a soul. 
Turing also considers the claim that the only way to know whether a machine thinks is to 
be that machine (Turing [1950], p. 17). Since this claim is applicable to human beings and 
machines alike, it leads to solipsism. This is a difficult position to maintain in everyday life, and 
"instead of arguing continually over this point it is usual to have the polite convention that 
everyone thinks." (Turing [1950], p. 17) It sure is usual to have that convention, but this does 
not show that we can extend that convention to machines. The two questions "What is human 
intelligence?" and "How do we know that an entity posseses human intelligence?" are related 
but distinct. 
In short, the TT can show at most that we can be mistaken in the attribution of human 
intelligence. It does not show anything either way about the possibility of machine intelligence. 
On the other hand, from a conceptual analysis of MI we can expect one out of two things: 
Either the concepts of machine and intelligence are compatible, or they are incompatible. In the 
first case, technical research will have to answer the question whether we can actually build 
such a machine, and empirical research will have to answer the question whether such a 
machine exists in nature. For example, empirical research could try to show that man is such a 
machine. (In section 2.5 I will distinguish natural machines, studied by natural science, from 
artificial machines, studied by engineering science.) In the first case, technical and empirical 
research may or may not succeed. But in the second case, technical research cannot result in the 
construction of a thinking machine and research in natural science cannot result in the discovery 
of a thinking machine (e.g., man). This essay tries to make it plausible that the second is the 
case. The argument has the following structure. 
(1) If A has human intelligence, A can explicate. 
(2) If A is a machine, it cannot explicate. 
(3) If A is a machine, it does not have human intelligence. 
The next two sections provide arguments in favor of each of the premisses (1) and (2). 
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2.3. Human intelligence and the abilit~ to explicate 
An explicit description of a state of the world (at a certain level of abstraction) enables anyone 
of an arbitrary group of people to identify the state whenever it occurs, in whichever context it 
occurs (provided that the part of the context stated in the description itself does occur). To 
explicate a state is to produce an explicit description of it without having access to such a 
description, at the same level of abstraction, during the explication process. A process explicates 
a state when its output, but not its input, is an explicit description of that state. Similarly, a pro-
cess explicates a process when its output, but not its input, is an explicit description of that pro-
cess. In the sequel, I often abbreviate "explication of a state or process" to "explication of a 
situation." · 
Examples of explications are: 
When we try to describe an event (a sequence of two or more states) to someone who has 
not been present at the scene of the event, we have to explicate the event. Usually, we succeed 
in this, though not perhaps to the extent that the group of people able to apply the result of our 
explication is arbitrary. There is usually still a lot of cultural background hidden in the descrip-
tion, as becomes apparent when we comunicate the description to a member of another culture 
or subculture (or even of another age group). 
In mathematics, finding a proof is explicating the logical relation between two or more 
statements. It is explicating the state of an abstract world to a very large extent. Everybody, 
irrespective of culture, race etc. is able to understand the resulting description, though not ever-
ybody may be able to master the background required to understand the description. But the 
background is fully explicated and thus available to anyone. 
In empirical scientific research, scientists start with a rather vague idea about a process and 
see whether that idea can be put in a context-free, repeatable form communicable to other 
members of the scientific community. As Jefferson remarks, scientists "begin without bothering 
their heads about rigid definitions of what they are doing. The so-called Laws of Science had 
generally no very tidy beginnings." (p. 4616) 
Teachers have (among other things) the task of communicating explicit descriptions to 
pupils, and face the explication task of finding out why a pupil does not understand an explicit 
description, i.e. cannot apply it. This is a very difficult task requiring insight into the back-
ground of the pupil. 
In a court of law, eye-witnesses have to explicate states and processes they observed, and 
the result of explications by different persons are used to construct an explicit description which 
can be compared to existing explicit descriptions of previous cases. Usually, it is only possible 
to a limited degree to describe the case as if it were a machine, and a lot of personal, unexpli-
cated background is needed to be able to judge similarities and dissimilarities. 
In these examples it is difficult if not impossible to produce a totally explicit description, 
and we often succeed only to a limited extent in explicating a state or process. Apparently, there 
are degrees of explicitness. A description is more explicit the more we succeed in describing a 
repeatable situation in a context-independent way, and in a way communicable to a larger group 
of people. We cannot therefore say that the ability to produce totally explicit descriptions is part 
of human intelligence. But would we attribute human intelligence to a being who could not 
explicate at all? If we would not, the ability to explicate is an essential part of human intelli-
gence. To answer this question, we must first look at examples of explication by machine. 
First of all, a human being who is a library member can be described at a certain level of 
abstraction as a machine, so there exist machines which can explicate. But obviously no explica-
tion process is described by that description, so the explicative ability of the human being is not 
described either. The library member machine cannot explicate at all. 
Take, as another example, a machine of which we may want to say that it explicates. We 
equip a computer with a video camera and program it so that it can produce the description 
"this is a white ball" when shown a white ball. This is not a trivial task to program, especially 
when shadows of neighboring objects and an uneven background are allowed, but in principle it 
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can be done. We can write the program in such a way that during its computation it does not 
have access to an explicit description of the situation, so following the definition of explication 
given above, we should say that the machine explicates the situation. 
But somehow, this does not feel right. The computer did not explicate, it performed a 
computation. But what is the difference? The machine went through a repeatable, context-
independent process of which we possess a communicable description. That description is its 
computer program. The programmer did explicate the situation in all dreadful detail for the 
computer and embedded the description he or she came up with in a computer program. The 
difference between what the programmer did and what the computer did is that the situations of 
which the program can produce explicit descriptions are precisely c-ircumscribed by the program 
text, while the range of situations of which the programmer can produce explicit descriptions is 
not precisely circumscribed. Present another situation to the computer, and all appearance of 
explication disappears: It cannot produce an output when its input is .not an element of the set of 
valid inputs. But present a different situation to the programmer, and he or she can produce a 
description of it. 
This account can be generalized by observing that the class of inputs to a machine must be 
explicitly described, because the machine itself is explicitly described. If the machine can pro-
duce explicit descriptions, the range of situations it can produce explicit descriptions of is there-
fore bounded by an explicit description. This contrasts with the explicative ability, however 
meagre, of human beings. The range of situations which nny being with human intelligence can 
produce explicit descriptions of is not bounded by an explicit description. Any human being has 
the ability to produce explicit descriptions of a set of states and processes which hasn't been cir-
cumscribed in advance, i.e. which hasn't been explicitly described by a finite and constant 
description. We would not attribute human intelligence to a being for which we could precisely 
spell out which situations it can and which situations it cannot produce explicit description of. 
The contrast between the presence or absence of a description of the situations which a 
system can produce explicit descriptions of is a part of the argument against the possibility of 
machine explication in the next section. Here, I want to emphasise that we do not attribute 
human intelligence to a being which does not have the ability to explicate a range of situations 
of which we cannot indicate the boundaries in advance. Moreover, I want to point out that the 
presence or absence of such an explicit description is a yes-or-no matter. In the case of 
machines, the description of this boundary is, by definition, totally explicit, and between total 
explicitness and more or less describability there is a large difference. Since the ability to expli-
cate is bound to the presence or absence of such a totally explicit description, explicative ability 
is a yes-or-no matter as well. There is no such thing as possessing a "little bit" of this ability. In 
other words, if possesion of this ability is (at least one of) the distinguishing characteristics 
between human intelligence and machine intelligence, then the difference between these two 
types of intelligence is not gradual, but discrete. 
This discrete jump from machine to human intelligence has nothing to do with the ability 
to produce totally or partly explicit descriptions. If a machine produces an explicit description, 
it is totally explicit; if a human being produces an explicit description, it is seldom totally expli-
cit. But the ability to produce descriptions of a situation which are more or less explicit differs 
from the ability to explicate an in principle unbounded range of situations. It is the last one 
which I regard as typical for human intelligence and of which I maintain that there is a sharp 
distinction between the presence or absence of a bound on the explicable situations. 
We cannot dodge the distinction either by a retreat to a metalevel. It might be maintained, 
for example, that the set of situations explicable by a human being is describable, in principle, 
by a fuzzy function. The function has value 0 for members definitively outside the set and is 1 
for situations definitively inside the set, and has a value between 1 and 0 for members which are 
"more or less" in the set. The graceful degradation of the ability to explicate a situation would 
then be modelled by this function. But this shifts the discussion from the question whether the 
set of explicable situations is crisp to the question whether this function is crisp, i.e. whether for 
any pair (s, n) where s represents a situation and n is a number between 0 and 1, we know 
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definitively that j(s)=n. If the function is not crisp, then it might be modelled in its turn by a 
fuzzy function, etc. But if the description of explicative ability is to remain finite, we must stop 
at some level, and we can resume the discussion at that level. The question to be answered by 
that discussion is whether the range of explicable situations is describable by an explicit descrip-
tion. Constructing this description out of a finite number of functions standing in certain rela-
tions to each other does not change the matter. 
A similar answer can be given to the claim that we may be able to build a learning 
machine. If that artifact is to be called a machine, at some level of abstraction it has an explicit 
description. That description may describe a learning algorithm, or it may describe a way to 
construct a learning algorithm, etc. My claim with respect to all these alternatives remains the 
same, viz. because -the machine is explicitly described, the range of situations it can produce 
explicit descriptions of is explicitly described, and therefore it does not have the ability to pro-
duce explicit descriptions of a range of situations which is not explicitly described in advance. I 
return briefly to the question of learning machines in the discussion of Turing (section 3.1). 
Keeping the range of situations to be explicated open and unspecified is reminiscent of the 
following remark by Gunderson: 
For if the case where the machine X-es is really the same and not just vaguely analogous to the 
case where man X-es, then we should be safe in making further assumptions about the 
machine's general capabilities and performances, just as in the case where we know that a man 
can do X and must thus be able to do a number of other things as well. (Gunderson [1985], p. 
48) 
This is Descartes' argument against the possibility that animals can think transposed to the 
domain of machines. Descartes argued that from the fact that animals can do one thing better 
than we can it does not follow that they can think. If an animal thinks as we do merely because 
it surpasses us in one capability, Descartes argues, then it should surpass us in any capability, so 
it should surpass us in thinking. Without adopting the view that animals have only a limited set 
of behaviors, we can agree with this argument in the domain of machines. 
My account of explication leaves out all persons with below-normal linguistic ability. My 
argument does not imply anything either way about these persons. It does not imply that they 
are machines, nor that they are not machines. I do think that an argument using explication is a 
first step to a more comprehensive argument presupposing no linguisitc ability. We would then 
need a concept like intentionality or Dreyfus' "zeroing in on the relevant aspects of the situa-
tion." But such an argument would use a more difficult concept than explication and would 
therefore be less explicit and more controversial. Moreover, using explication as a first step 
increases our understanding of the issue. 
As a final caveat against the statement that human beings can explicate one can remark 
that what truly distinguishes human beings from machines is not that they can explicate, but that 
they can understand descriptions which are not explicit. This may be so, but some people can 
then easily raise the question whether someone really understands such a description. More 
importantly, one would then have to argue that the process of understanding descriptions which 
are not explicit cannot be explicitly describable. Such an argument would be more comprehen-
sive than the current arguent if it can be shown that people with below-normal linguistic ability 
and non-linguistic animals have the capability to understand non-explicit descriptions. An argu-
ment along these lines would be one of those improvements mentioned above, which are more 
difficult and more controversial. 
2.4. Explication by machine 
In section 2.3, the basic argument against the existence of machines with explicative ability -or 
of explicit descriptions of the ability to explicate, which comes down to the same thing- was 
already presented. To posses the ability to explicate is to be able to explicate a range of situa-
tions which is not described explicitly in advance; the range of situations which any machine 
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can produce explicit descriptions of is (explicitly) described in advance; so machines cannot 
have the ability to explicate. 
This argument has some superficial similarity to the argument for the unsolvability of the 
halting problem. The halting problem for a particular computer program and input is to prove 
that that program fed with that input will terminate, i.e. yield an output. The halting problem 
cannot be solved uniformly, i.e. there is no computer program which can solve the halting prob-
lem for an arbitrary program and input. Such a program would take as its input 1. an arbitrary 
program P and 2. an input I to P, and produce as output Yes if P terminates with input I and 
No if it does not terminate with I. The proof of the nonexistence of such a program relies on a 
contradiction which emerges when such a program is given the problem whether it itself will 
terminate when it is given the problem whether it will terminate. 4 
The general problem of showing that a program terminates for a class of inputs is not 
mechanically solvable by a program. Similarly, there is no general explicit description of the 
ability to explicate. The argument is roughly similar, because here too, a contradiction emerges 
when the concept of explicit description is applied to the process of explication. 
But there are also dissimilarities. I mention three of them. First of all, the argument for the 
impossibility of the explicit description of the ability to explicate is very informal, while the 
proof of the unsolvability of the halting problem is formal. It could not be otherwise, for a for-
mal proof of the impossibility to describe explicitly the ability to explicate would be self-
contradictory. Such a proof would have to rely on an explicit description of the explicative abil-
ity in order for the argument that such an explicit description does not exist to be called a proof 
What can be done at most is to show that the assumption that such a description exists is coun-
terintuitive. This is what has been done, the intuition in question being that the range of situa-
tions which can be explicated is not bounded by an explicit description. 
This leads to the second dissimilarity with the unsolvability proof of the halting problem. 
The unsolvability of the halting problem is proved using the self-referential nature of a solution 
to that problem. Self-referential descriptions are not necessarily contradictory just because they 
are s~lf-referential, but some are, and an explicit description of a uniform procedure to solve 
the halting problem is a case in point. But the self-referential nature of an explicit description of 
explicative ability is not contradictory. Mind-boggling, perhaps, but not logically impossible. 
To see this, consider the fact that given an explicit description of the ability to explicate, 
any explication process must be an instance of (at least) that description. Explicit descriptions 
are the measuring stick by which we determine whether two processe instances are occurrences 
of the same process. But the assumption that any explication process is an instance of that 
description implies that future explications are instances of that description as well. That in turn 
implies that we know the future to some extent, i.e. we know how explication processes will 
behave, just as we know how bodies with non-zero mass will behave under the influence of 
gravity. But in the case of explication, this consequence is much more far-reaching than in the 
case of the processes studied in physics. Most of the future processes have yet to be explicated. 
Because we may explicate in the future just about any situation for any purpose, possessing an 
explicit description of how these explication processes will evolve under the influence of various 
environmental conditions is almost tantamount to knowing in advance what will be relevant in 
those situations for those purposes. But even these purposes must be explicated, and those expli-
cations should satisfy the explicit description of explication as well. If those purposes in their 
turn are ever explicated, the argument iterates by observing that these explications are instances 
of the description as well, etc. And, .of course, the explicit description of all this is also the 
result of an explication, which must be an instance of the description it produces as well. None 
of these consequences of the assumption that there is an explicit description of the ability to 
explicate are logically contradictory to each other or to the assumption, but they sure are mind-
boggling. 
4. A simple proof of this theorem is given in Rogers [1967], p. 24. 
l 
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The third and final difference with the unsolvability of the halting problem concerns the 
ability to explicitly describe individual solutions to the problem in question. In the case of the 
halting problem, all that has been shown is that it is not uniformly solvable. It is unsolvable by 
one explicit description (or a finite conjunction of explicit descriptions): But in particular cases, 
mechanical proof of termination may well be possible and, in fact, in many cases such proofs 
have been found. The unsolvability of the halting problem may be construed as saying that to 
find such a proof, human creativity is needed. (The termination proof is not mechanical in the 
sense that it is found mechanically, it is mechanical in the sense that it can be verified mechani-
cally once it is found.) 5 
By contrast, in the case of explication, there are arguments why individual cases of expli-
cation cannot be explicitly described either. There are three arguments for this claim, which. fol-
low from the demands of communicability of explicit process descriptions and from the 
context-independence and repeatability of the processes they describe. If valid, these arguments 
provide extra reason to believe that a computer producing explicit descriptions of white balls is 
not explicating at all. 
First, communicability. If an individual explication process is explicitly described, then it 
has an explicitly described initial state. Now, if I explicate something and try to describe the ini-
tial state of the explication process explicitly in order to communicate it to somebody, that state 
seems to be the most elusive of states to describe. At the start of an explication process, it is not 
yet clear what aspects of the situation to be explicated are relevant. Using the language of state 
spaces, to try to describe the initial state of an explication process is to try to describe a position 
5. Myhill [1952] argues that the psychological significance of Church's theorem is that our finitude compels 
us to be creative. Church's theorem is that any non-trivial axiomatic theory, such as Eucledian geometry or 
number theory, is undecidable, i.e. there is no uniform, mechanical way to decide of a given formula wheth-
er or not it is a theorem of that theory. To be a theorem of an axiomatic theory is to follow from the axioms 
of the theory (and those of logic) by applying inference rules. There is a mechanical way to generate all 
theorems of an axiomatic theory, but the problem is that there is no mechanical way to generate all 
nontheorems of the theory. If a given formula is provable, it will be generated, but if it has not yet been 
generated, it may be because it just hasn't turned up yet or because it is a nontheorem. Since the list of 
theorems of a non-trivial theory is infinite, we may not be able to reach a decision. Note that this problem 
does not arise if we could mechanically generate all the nontheorems as well. In that case, we could turn on 
two machines to generate theorems and nontheorems, respectively, and be sure that the formula will turn up 
in one of the two lists. 
Myhill's argument is that we are finite in the same way as machines are finite, so that we must generate 
the theorems of a theory in some order. This compels us to be creative. for 
" ... we have commonly at every step a wide choice of the succeeding step. This choice is made by us. 
keeping in mind the end as well as the initial premisses or axioms of the deduction. in accordance with 
principles which seem in some sense to be radically incapable of systematization. This is the locus of 
genius." (Myhill [1952], p. 176). 
Myhill's argument is weak where he compares man's finitude with that of a machine but observes creativity 
at work in the generation of theorems in the case of man only and not in the case of machines. He has not 
shown why man and machine are analogous to each other in the case of finitude but not in the case of 
creativity. 
My own view is that the analogy fails for finitude as well as for creativity. We are not able to oversee 
even a small portion of the consequences of a non-trivial set of axioms such as those of Peano arithmetic by 
looking at the axioms alone. But we do find some interesting consequences, given some time and resources 
to manipulate formulas, e.g. pencil and paper. The analogy fails here because a machine typically comes up 
with many more consequences in the same amount of time, but comes up indiscriminately with relevant as 
well as irrelevant ones. Our finitude consists at best of our ability to deduce a small number of highly 
relevant consequences and at worst of our ability to deduce a small number of irrelevant consequences. In 
the case of man, there is a continuum between these two; in the case of machines. there is mereJy the ability 
to exercise the last type of finitude at high speed, i.e. produce theorems at high speed (some of which are re-
cignized by us as being relevant. The difference between a continuum and a poinr is sufficiently great to say 
that the analogy between the finitude of man and machine breaks down. Note that this analysis agrees with 
the conclusion of this chapter, which is that a process which recognizes relevancy cannot always be said to be 
in a state and is therefore not explicitly describable. 
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in a state space while the subject who carries out the explication does not know yet at which 
position he is. At the start of explication, it is not yet clear even what the possible problem 
states are. At the start of explication, there is no state space. In a very real sense, there is noth-
ing to communicate about it. The claim that there is an explicit description of the initial state of 
an explication process is counterintuitive because the start of an explication process is of such a 
nature that the concept of state is not yet applicable. 
The second argument concerns the context-independence of explicitly described processes. 
Context-independence implies that the effects of every possible relevant input on the explication 
process is explicitly described. Explicit descriptions mention every relevant aspect if the 
environment, and what is not mentioned is not relevant. But one peculiarity of explication is 
that just about anything can be relevant for it. People have found explicit descriptions when 
staring in the fire and dozing off, or while taking a walk, or when entering a bus. We often find 
an explicit description of something while thinking of something totally different or doing some 
physical work unrelated to the problem, or when hardly thinking at all, as in the moments just 
before we fall asleep. Assuming that we can catch all this in a context-free description, i.e. one 
mentioning all and only the relevant aspects of the environment, is counterintuitive. 
The third and final argument concerns repeatability. If an explication process is explicitly 
described, it is repeatable. That is, if the initial state and the ensuing sequence of inputs are 
reproduced or simply reoccur accidentaly, tl:].en the explicit description predicts that the same 
process must ensue, producing the same outputs. Now, how does one repeat an explication pro-
cess? One single person cannot repeat an· explication process. Explication is irreversible (bar-
ring loss of memory, in which case one can doubt if we are still talking about the same person). 
But let us write this of as a pragmatical difficulty and perform a thought experiment. We 
place two persons (either two numerically different persons or one person at two different 
times, who the second time has forgotten everything about the earlier explication) and place 
them in the same situation. Then more often than not they explicate the situation differently. 
But then in order to be applicable to both explication processes, the explicit description must 
account for these differences. And just as before, just about anything about the two persons 
and their histories and background can be relevant to account for the differences in the explica-
tion processes. There seems to be no limit to what should be accounted for in the explicit 
description of the explication process. Of course, thought experiments about identical twins 
growing up in identical circumstances on identical twin planets in identical but separate regions 
of the universe are out of place here, since two objects can be identical only with respect to an 
explicit description, and the existence of such a description is what is precisely being questioned 
here. 
To sum up, in addition to the ability to explicate not being explicitly describable, individual 
explication processes are not explicitly describable either. The first claim depends upon the 
absence of an explicit bound on the range of situations to be explicated, while the three argu-
ments for second claim all depend upon the observation that just about anything about the per-
son who does the explicating and the situation to be explicated can be relevant. The two claims 
may be combined in one single slogan, Relevance is not explicitly describable. The statement 
that a machine cannot explicate then becomes the statement that what is relevant about its own 
history or the environment is, for a machine, precisely circumscribed. 
This ties in well with the concept of state, which is the essence of the concept of state evo-
lution function and thus of the concept of a machine. A state is a precise memory of the history 
of the system which contains all information required to be able to describe every possible 
future behavior in every possible evolution of the environment in which the machine is placed. 
To say what the state evolution function of a system is and in which state it now is in is to state 
exactly what is relevant about its past and about its environment. 
Conversely, to say that explication and explicative ability cannot be explicitly described, is 
to say that these processes are of a kind to which the concept of state is not applicable. And to 
the extent that these processes are essential for human intelligence .. to that extent human 
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intelligence is a system to which the state concept is not applicable. 
This undercuts any scientific effort to describe human intelligence, for scientific research 
is the search for state evolution functions. This does not imply that psychology as a science is 
impossible, for psychology studies many more processes apart from explication. But it does 
imply that for any psychological process of which explication is an essential part, or for which a 
similur argument can be given, no description can be given which takes the form of a state evo-
lution function. Descriptions of it will deviate fundamentally from those we are accustomed to 
in physics. 6 
2.5. Artifical intelligence and machine intelligence 
From my argument it cannot be concluded that no artificial intelligence can be constructed. To 
see this, let me define an artifact as any entity constructed by man. Some machines are 
artifacts, like radios, TV's, cars, and computers, but other machines are not artifacts, like the 
solar system, a proton, or a falling stone. There are also artifacts which are not machines under 
an interesting description, like paintings, novels, chairs and houses. 7 
Following this definition, human beings are artifacts as well, because they are created by 
human beings. Viewed this way, the goal of AI research is to find another way to create an 
artifact which can think. The argument in this essay does not. attempt to show that this is impos-
sible, but that if there is a second way, then whatever is produced in that way is not a machine, 
i.e. we wont't have an explicit description of how it works. Or, more precisely, at the level at 
which we can describe it explicitly, we can't describe its explication behavior. 8 
6. Fodor [1983], pp. 105-116 gives such an argument. I turn to his argument at the end of section 4.2. See 
note 12 of chapter 4. 
7. There are some interesting borderline cases like cattle which are carefuly bred in agro-industry and plants 
which are grown in totally artifical conditions, but these do not affect the argument which follows. 
8. This way of viewing AI removes the excitement of boldly doing something totally unprecedented from AI 
research. Man creates man, and at a alarming rate at that. Another question now crops up: Why would we 
want to find another way of doing this? Good engineering research always has some kind of useful behavior. 
in mind (see section 3.5). Unless an AI is to be viewed as a work of art, in which case questions of esthetics 
instead of usefulness should be asked, we should be able to discuss the use of AI's just as we can discuss the 
use of cars, airplanes and radios. 
This points to a second cluster of questions we can ask. Is it ethical to use an AI as if it were a tool'? 
Would an AI be able to suffer? Is a being which cannot suffer intelligent'? Would it be afraid to die'? Can 
we stop its production at any moment? Can we kill it? Would it fall in love? Are the makers responsible 
for their Al's and if so, are they just as responsible for the AI's they created as parents are for their children'? 
Is there another responsibility, connected to the fact that the makers created a type of being and are thus 
more or less in the position of God to Adam? Shelley's story of Frankenstein and his creature (not the cari-
cature presented in popular movies) considers some of these questions in a 19-th century gothic setting, and 
the movie Blade Runner treats them in a futuristic setting. A recent article in AI Magazine (LaChat [1986]) 
discusses some of the ethical problems of artificial intelligence. In a res pons, ( Wieringa [1986]) I point out 
some ethical p~radoxes of Al's. 
3.1. Turing 
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Chapter 3 
Comparison with other viewpoints 
Turing [1950] supports his claim that the TT is a test for thinking by refuting nine objections to 
the claim that machines can think and giving one positive argument for the possibility machine 
intelligence. This is a rather curious procedure: Suppose that it is true that the nine arguments 
attacked by Turing are wrong, then he still depends upon the plausibility of his one positive 
argument to lend credibility to the claim that machines can think. If nine arguments against the 
possibility of MI are wrong, then there may be a tenth argument which is correct. To show that 
such a tenth argument does not exist, it must be shown that machines can, in fact, be intelligent. 
But suppose that his positive argument is correct. Then machines can, in principle, be intelli-
gent. From that we cannot draw the further conclusion that the TT is a test for thinking. To 
show that the TT tests the right thing, we need an independent argument. 
The reason why Turing apparently thinks that he has defended the thesis that the TT is a 
test for thinking lies in the shift of attention from what thinking is to how we know that some-
one thinks. This been discussed in section 2.2. Here, I want to discuss his positive argument for 
the possibility of MI and the three of his nine refutations which are incompatible with my argu-
ment. 
His only positive argument is that some day, we may be able to construct a learning 
machine. This appeal to learning machines is perhaps a response to Jefferson's remark that 
It is not enough, therefore, to build a machine that could use words (if that were possible), it 
would have to be able to create concepts and to find for itself suitable words in which to 
express additions to knowledge that it brought about. (Jefferson [1949], p. 1110, cited in Tur-
ing [1950], p. 17. Italics in the original.) 
Jefferson made this remark to deny the possibilty of thinking machines, and Turing's response is 
that it may well be possible to construct such a machine. My response to this is that some day, 
we may be able to find a second way to construct an intelligent artifact, but that Turing has not 
given any argument that the artifact will be a machine. In fact, the procedure he proposes, ini-
tializing an artifact with the state of mind of a human b~by at birth and subjecting it to the same 
environmental influences as a baby, raises some co-nceptual problems. What, exactly, are we to 
understand by "initializing" in this case? And what is the "same state" and the "same environ-
ment?" We can talk about the same state and same environment only with respect to an explicit 
description, which then should mention all relevant aspects which are required for an intelligent 
end-product. It is imaginable that we reproduce living tissue in artificial circumstances, implant 
it in an artificial womb and then raise it like a human being. The result may well be as intelli-
gent as any human being is -but then again, it may not. 1 But there is no reason to suppose that 
we should posses an explicit description of it in order to go through the creation process, so 
there is no reason to suppose that it would be a machine. The argument of chapter 2 strongly 
suggests that it would not be a machine. 
Three of Turing's nine refutations are incompatible with my thesis. I discuss each of these 
in turn. 
My argument belongs to a group of arguments which have the form "machines cannot do 
X," with X= "fall in love," or "be creative," "enjoy strawberries," etc. Turing refutes these 
arguments by noting 1. that they are usually not argued at all and 2. that they are based on lim-
ited and outdated experience with machines (Turing [1950], p. 18). This experience is con-
tingent, Turing says, and cannot serve as a basis for the statement that machines in principle 
I. This draws attention again to the ethical problems mentioned in footnote 8 of chapter 2. 
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cannot do X. 2 But this refutation cannot apply to my objection that machines cannot explicate, 
for 1. that objection is argued, and 2. it is motivated by an analysis of the concept of a machine 
as it is used in automata theory and systems theory. 3· 
A second objection against the possibility of MI discussed by Turing comes from Lady 
Lovelace, who said of the world's first proto-computer conceived by Babbage that it "has no 
pretensions to originate anything. It can do whatever we know how to order it to perform." 
(quoted in Turing [1950], p. 20/21). In so far as to explicate something is to originate some-
thing, Turing's reply to this argument is also directed at my argument and must therefore be 
countered. Turing's reply is that there may be machines which only do what we know how to 
order it to do, but which are still intelligent. For example, he says, Wy may subject an artifact to 
an education. Or, as another example, if there is an intelligent discrete-state machine, we can 
program a computer to behave like it. 
My answer to the first reply has been given above. Turing has not shown that an educated 
artifact would be a machine at an interesting level of description. The second reply by Turing is 
hardly a refutation, for the existence of an intelligent discrete-state machine borrows its credibil-
ity completely from science fiction and not from any plausibility argument or scientific fact. 
Saying that it could exist without supporting it by argument is wishful thinking and hardly 
invalidates my argument. 
As an aside, we may note that Lady Lovelace's objection does contain a possible confusion 
regarding creativity and the production of new, unexpected outputs. Systems are machines 
under a description. Their behavior is fixed by their description and in that sense, they can 
only do what "they are told to do." This "telling them what to do" is only metaphorical for in 
the case of natural machines like the solar system, the rule for constructing explicit descriptions 
of them is that the natural system "tells us" what an explicit description at the level of abstrac-
tion we are interested in should be. Whenever there is a significant mismatch between descrip-
tion and behavior, we adapt the description, not the behavior. In the case of artifical machines, 
on the other hand, we make the system behave in the way that the description prescribes. In 
case of a significant mismatch between description and behavior, we adapt the behavior, not the 
description. 
In both cases, behavior is fixed by a description and we know the description. But if the 
description is complex, the system can behave in a quite unexpected and in that sense novel 
way. For example, an analog computer solving a differential equation which is not analytically 
solvable (i.e. cannot be solved by manipulating the symbols in the equation) tells us something 
new, viz. the solution(s) of the equation in this particular situation. The differential equation is 
the explicit description of the machine, so the machine does what we tell it to do, but the 
description is too complex for us to know fully what we are telling the machine to do. But doing 
things we were not able to foresee is not sufficient evidence for creative ability. Creativity is not 
the same as unexpected behavior, and both Lady Lovelace and Turing are very dose to confus-
ing these two. For example, Turing says that 
it is perhaps worth remarking that the appreciation of something as surprising requires as much 
of a "creative mental act" whether the surprising event originates from man, a book, a machine 
or anything else. (Turing [1950], p. 22) 
An unexpected act is creative only if it follows in some sense from the context of the act. It 
does not need to follow logically from the context, but it must have some connection with it. 
For example, it must be applicable to the the problem at hand, or unexpected structures of the 
situation must become visible, or a new viewpoint on the state of affairs must be established. 
Doing something unexpected is not an act of creation if it is totally unconnected to the 
2. Cf. note 9. 
3. It also accords with systems description in modern science, see chapter I. footnote 2. 
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environment. Random number generators are not creative. 4· 
A third objection against the possibility of MI discussed by Turing is reconstructed by him 
as follows. 
"If each man had a definite set of rules of conduct by which he regulated his life he would be 
no better than a machine. But there are no such rules, so men cannot be machines." (Turing 
[1950], p. 23) 
The rules mentioned in this argument are like traffic rules. They are explicit descriptions which 
we observe, in the sense of "seeing" as well as "following." But as Ryle [1949] (p. 28 ff.) 
argued, not only are these rules of everyday conduct not known to us and therefore not 
observed by us, their existence would be contradictory as well. If the principle that man acts by 
observing rules were true, then to apply such a rule we would need a rule to guide us in the 
application, but for the application of that rule we would require a still higher level rule, etc. so 
that we would never come down to acting at all. 
But from the fact that we do not and cannot observe such rules we cannot conclude that we 
are not machines. Machines do not follow such rules either. The solar system does not observe 
the explicit description we gave it, and neither does my radio. If we rephrase the objection to 
correct for this possible confusion, we get 
"If each man is explicitly described, he would be no better than a machine. But there is no 
such description, so he is not a machine." 
Put like this, it is obviously a non sequitur. The only way to find such descriptions, Turing says, 
is scientific observation. There are no circumstances under which we could say, "We have 
searched enough. There are no such [explicit descriptions]" (ibid. p. 23). But Turing is only 
partly correct in this. The correct observation to make is that the only way to find explicit 
descriptions of natural systems is by scientific observation, but that scientific observation cannot 
show that there are no such descriptions. But conceptual analysis can show that there are no 
such descriptions (while it cannot find those descriptions if there are any). 5 For example, 
mathematics has shown quite convincingly, without any empirical search, that there is no square 
circle. On the other hand, it cannot provide us with descriptions of squares and circles occurring 
withing nature. As a less trivial example, Church has shown, without empirical research, that 
there is no algorithm for deciding whether a predicate logic formula is a theorem in any non-
trivial axiomatic theory, and Gdel has shown that it is impossible to axiomatize Peano arithmetic 
in such a way that all true number-theoretic statements are provable. In general, all mathemati-
cal results can be viewed as impossibility claims in this way: If it has been proven that A => B, 
then it is impossible to find a system in nature to which both A and -, B apply. 
I conclude that Turing's one argument in support of the possibility of MI is weak, and that three 
of his nine attempts at refuting objections to the possibility of MI fail. In particular, my thesis is 
not refuted by his arguments. On the other hand, my argument strengthens the position he 
wanted to refute, as is argued in the next section. 
4. Random number generators raise conceptual problems of their own. It is very hard to describe explicitly 
how an object is unrelated to its environment. 
5. A possible exception to this statement is Feynman 's conceptual argument for the law of conservation of 
momentum, starting from symmetry principles. (Feynman et al. [1963], section 10-3) This does not invali-
date my argument, however. 
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3.2. Jefferson 
The Turing test is a response to Jefferson's [1949] remark that 
Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of thoughts and emo-
tions felt, and not by chance fall of symbols, could we agree that machine equals brain -that is, 
not only write it but know that it had written it. (Jefferson [1949], p. 1110) 
Turing's response is that such a machine would think because it would pass the TT. From the 
quotation it would seem that Jefferson should agree with this, for his statement is as mll:ch as a 
proposal for a TT. A machine passing a TT would have to be able to compose a sonnet and 
discourse about it. However, a few paragraphs earlier Jefferson says that explication is a prere-
quisite for conceptual thinking. 
"[We] find ourselves woefully lacking in ability to describe our percepts. The variety of the visual and 
general perceptual scene alone is too great for those frail instruments -words- and it is because of this that 
literature flourishes. It is almost boring to repeat that it is because he has a 
vocabulary that man's intellectual progress has been made -by the day-by-day record of how far he has 
gone in his pilgrimage towards finite knowledge, that journey without an end. ( p. 1109-1110) 
To say that our descriptions cannot express the variety of events around us and that the 
knowledge expressed in those descriptions is finite, is one step removed from the statement that 
the explication process, which crosses the bridge from that infinite variety to the finite 
knowledge of it, is not describable in an explicit -finite- description. The argument in chapters 1 
and 2 can be construed as an explication of Jefferson's remark, which strengthenths it by giving 
reasons why machines cannot explicate. 
3.3. Semantic information processing 
It is sometimes maintained that AI programs specify not just any information processes, but 
semantic information processes (Dennett [1981 b], Haugeland [1981]). By this is meant that they 
have representational content, i.e. are about something. Added to the assumption that "intelli-
gent beings are semantic engines -in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations 
under which they consistently make sense" (Hauge land [1981], p .31), this leads to the 
hypothesis that 
people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different 
manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. (ibid.) 
If computers and people are merely different manifestations of the same underlying 
phenomenon, then there are machines which can explicate. So either this hypothesis is correct 
and my argument is wrong or the hypothesis is wrong and my argument correct. It is not diffi-
cult to show that Haugeland's hypothesis is wrong. 
First of all, Haugeland argues that the following two premisses may turn out to be true: 
( 1) intelligent beings are semantic engines 
(2) AI programs specify semantic engines 
But from these two premisses we can conclude only that the set of semantic engines includes the 
set of of intelligent beings as well as the set of systems specified by AI programs. Nothing fol-
lows about the intersection of the set of intelligent beings with that of the set of systems speci-
fied by AI programs. In particular. it does not follow that there are AI programs which are 
intelligent. 
But though the argument may be wrong, maybe it can be fixed as follows. 
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( 1 ') semantic engines are intelligent beings 
(2') AI programs are semantic engines 
(3') AI programs are intelligent beings. 
The claim that human beings and AI programs are species of the same genus can be explicated 
as 
( 4 ') human beings are semantic engines. 
Together with ( 1 ') we can then conclude that human beings are intelligent beings for the same 
reason as AI programs are intelligent beings. (Actually, we need a stronger claim than (1 ') to 
support this conclusion, viz. that only semantic engines are intelligent beings. Otherwise, there 
might be other reasons, besides being semantic engines, why human eings are intelligent. In 
what follows, I wilf refute (1 '), so that consideration of this stronger claim is not necessary.) 
There are three claims to be substantiated here, ( 1 '), (2') and ( 4'). These arguments 
depend crucially upon the concept of representational content, so I will explicate that first. 
Human beings have mental states, which are characterized (following Searle [1983], but I 
think what follows will be accepted by all parties in the game) by their representational content 
and their psychological mode. For example, if I want you to leave the room, the representa-
tional content of the mental state I am in is that you will leave the room, and the psychological 
mode is that of wanting. If I believe it is raining, the representational content of the state I am 
in is that it is raining, and the psychological mode is that of believing. Now, this is very near 
common sense, though a detailed treatment will encounter a number of problems which have no 
easy solutions (see Searle [1983]). But armed with these simple examples, we can explicate the 
claim that semantic engines are intelligent as the claim that semantic engines have states with 
representational content and psychological mode. In discussions of this claim, only the first half 
has receive attention, so I will concentrate upon that part of it only. Claims (1 ')-(4') are accord-
ingly reduced to 
( 1 ") semantic engines have representational content. 
(2") AI programs are semantic engines 
(3 ") AI programs have representational content. 
( 4 ") human beings are semantic engines. 
Only (1 ") and (3") differ from (1 ') and (3'); the other two statements are unchanged. 
To understand the arguments given in favor of (1 ") and (2 "), it is useful to see what is 
involved in (3"). An AI program is at least a simulation of cognitive processes (and according 
to (2"), it is more than that). There are therefore two modes of representing involved in (3"). 
First, an AI program which simulates the belief that it is raining, represents that belief in the 
same way as a simulation of a thunderstorm can be in a state which represents a state of the 
thunderstorm. This way of representing is identical with the representing in any simulation pro-
gram. Clearly, the existence of this representation in a medium is no reason to assume that the 
medium (automated or not) shares in any way properties with what is represented. It has been 
remarked frequently that just as a simulation of a thunderstorm is not wet, a simulation of a 
belief has no representational content. Figure 1 makes the situation clear. This introduces the 
second mode of representing in the particular case of cognitive simulation. The represented 
belief has representational content. This is a crucial difference with the case of the thunder-
storm, whose states have no representational content. What is needed in the case of cognitive 
simulation, is an argument why the presence of representational content in the simulated states 
warrants the claim that the simulating states have representational content as well. Whatever this 
argument is, it should be applicable to cognitive simulations and not to physical simulations. We 
can use the simulation of a thunderstorm as a touch-stone to check this requirement. 
Now, (3") says that an AI program has states with representational content and gives (1 ") 
state in cogni-
tive simulation 
of belief 
? 
represents 
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and (2") as argument. Let us look at the support which Haugeland [1981] gives to (1 ") and 
(2") and see whether it applies to cognitive simulations and not to simulations of thunderstorms. 
Haugeland defines a semantic engine as an automatic formal system with an interpretation 
such that the syntactical rules of the formal system are truth-preserving. A syntactical process is 
defined as a process in which formal tokens (e.g. marks on paper) are moved around according 
to explicit rules. Such a process is truth-preserving with respect to an interpretation iff the rules 
will transform tokens which are true in the interpretation into other tokens which are true in the 
same interpretation. Because of this truth-preservation, Haugeland says, states in a semantic 
engine have representational content, thus substantiating ( 1 "). (2") is supported by observing 
that AI programs are truth-preserving automatic formal systems. ( 4 ") is not explicitly argued. I 
will now discuss these substantiations. 
The shortest remarks can be made about the support for (2") and (4"). I will deal first 
with ( 4 "), because support for it is virtually non-existent. The only reason I can discover for 
believing (4") is that humaa beings are in states with representational content, so they must be 
semantic engines. But this depends upon an inversion of ( 1 "), viz. 
Systems with representational content are semantic engines. 
This is the original claim (1). No support is given for this claim, so I take it that (4") has not 
been argued by Dennett and Haugeland. 
The support for (2") is, as far as I can see, correct. An AI program is (at least) a cogni-
tive simulation, and a cognitive simulation is a formal, automatic, truth-preserving system. But I 
also think that (2") is correct for our touch-stone, the simulation of a thunderstorm, so that the 
argument (1 ")-(2")-(3") collapses. To see why (2") applies to a simulation of a thunderstorm, 
I will change to less exotic terminology to describe the same situation. 
A formal system is what is usually called an axiomaTic system, a list of axioms in predicate 
logic, together with inference rules to derive theorems from the axioms. The axioms and infer-
ence rules are purely syntactic, i.e. they move around symbols according to their form. These 
symbols can be marks on paper or states in a computer memory or any other discrete set of dis-
tinct elements. The system in which these symbols are realized is usually called the implementa-
tion medium. In an automatic formal system, the implementation medium carries out the symbol 
manipulations automatically. Examples of automatic formal systems are TM 's (of which UTM 's 
are a subclass) and digital computers. · 
In predicate logic, meaning is reduced to the denotation of linguistic symbols by choosing 
a universe of objects and assigning objects in that universe as the denotation of formulas of the 
language. The precise way in which this is done is explained in any textbook on predicate logic 
and is irrelevant here. Important is that the axioms and theorems of an axiomatic system have a 
meaning with respect to an intepretation in a universe of objects. I will refer to this concept of 
meaning as "interpretation in the standard predicate logic sense." -
- 24-
In a purely syntactic system, the question of the truth of a formula does not a.rise. With 
respect to an interpretation, however, a formula can be true or false. An interpretation in which 
a set S of formulas is true is called a model of that set. Now, suppose we have a model for the 
axioms of an axiomatic system, we can ask the question whether the inference rules, which are 
defined purely syntactically, are such that the theorems which can be derived by them are true 
in the model as well? An axiomatic system for which this is the case, regardless of the interpre-
tation we choose, is called sound. In a sound axiomatic system, any model for the axioms is a 
model for all theorems. Soundness is what Dennett and Haugeland call truth-preservation. 
The upshot of all this is that, by definition, a semantic engine is an automated, sound 
axiomatic system. This includes just about any simulation program. A simulation of a thunder-
storm can be viewed as a an extension of the axioms of predicate logic with axioms (empirical 
laws) describing the behavior of thunderstorms (at a certain level of abstraction). A computer-
ized simulation of a thunderstorm is therefore a semantic engine. 
These explications put us also in a position to judge the value of ( 1 "). The claim is that an 
automated, sound axiomatic system can be in states which have representational content. Apply-
ing this to our touch-stone, states in a simulation of a thunderstorm have representational con-
tent. Now this cannot be true unless we radically re-interpret the phrase "representational con-
tent." The way in which this phrase must be reinterpreted to make sense of the statements that a 
simulation of a thunderstorm can be in states which have representational content is that 
"representational content" means the same as "interpretation" in the predicate logic sense. 
"State X is the interpretation of symbol Y" is then synonymous with "state X is the representa-
tional content of symbol Y." The situation is, on this view, much simpler than that of figure 1 
and is shown in figure 2. 
computational state 
has 
directed at 
------ object 
representational content 
Figure 2 
The representational content line now coincides with the interpretation line. If this picture is 
correct (which I believe it isn't), then we are justified in saying that the computer believes that 
we believe that it is raining. Haugeland c.s. presumably have something different in mind, viz. 
that if the computer is in the appropriate state, it believes that it is raining, it believes it in the 
same way as we do when we believe that it is raining. The picture which expresses this now col-
lapses into figure 3. 
directed at 
computational state object 
directed at 
belief state object 
Figure 3. 
The difference between the two pictures is that in figure 2 the computer simulates a belief state 
while in figure 3 both the computational state and the belief state simulate (which is now identi-
fied with "represent," "is interpreted in") an object. In figure 3, simulation of the belief state 
has turned into duplication. I will not analyze this confusion here but concentrate on another 
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mistake. In both pictures, interpretation in the predicate logic sense is confused with representa-
tional content. Put differently, a computational state (which is a formal symbol to which an 
interpretation function can assign a denotation) is viewed in the same way as a belief state 
(which is a mental state with representational content). 
But this equivocation between computational state and mental state leads to the well-known 
homunculus mistake. A symbol in a formal system is given a meaning by an agent external to 
it. We are allowed to give any interpretation to a sound (and consistent) axiomatic system. 
These interpretations are therefore not internal to the system. As is argued above, the agent 
assigning the meaning is, ultimately, an intentional being, i.e. a being who can be in states with 
representational content. The link between the intentional agent and the interpreted formal sys-
tem may be mediated by a series of automated interpretation functions, but this does not affect 
the argument. (The automation of interpretation functions is treated below when we discuss 
Pylyshyn 's standpoint). If Hrepresentational con tentH is re-interpreted as "interpretation" and if 
a belief by a human being has representational content, then a belief state is interpreted. But 
who assigns the interpretation to the mental state? We must postulate a homunculus who does 
the interpreting and for whom the belief-state has representational content. The homunculus is 
an intentional being which can be in states with representational content, so the argument is 
back at square zero: Who assigns meaning to the states which the homunculus can be in? We 
get an infinite regress in the argument. 
Part of the reason for distinguishing representational content from interpretation in the 
predicate logic sense is, precisely, to avoid this infinite series of homunculi. As Searle ([1983], 
p. 17, p. 60) remarks, the content of a belief is not the object of that belief. Some intentional 
states, like the famous belief that the king of France is bald, are not about anything, but they do 
have representational content, i.e. that the king of France is bald. Independently of the question 
whether this is a good solution to the problem of intentional objects, the distinction is valid in 
uncontroversial cases. If I am standing outside in the rain and believe that it is raining, my 
belief is an intentional state directed at rain, the wet substance falling from the heavens. 
Because of that, the belief has the representational content that it rains. My belief is not directed 
at its content "that it rains" but at the rain falling on my head. 
At this point, the focus of the argument is usually shifted from truth-preservation (i.e. sound-
ness in the predicate logic sense) to automation. A semantic engine is an automated system. 
Fodor [1968] and Dennett [1971], [1978] admit that we do need higher homunculi, but that in an 
automated system these are progressively simpler and that the series stops at the point where a 
homunculus is simply a subroutine in a computer program (or a piece of hardware executing a 
subroutine). In this view, the existence of automated formal systems shows that the argument 
leading to the infinite series of homunculi is mistaken, and is mistaken where it says that a 
homunculus must be intentional in the same way as the system whose states it interprets is inten-
tional. Computers show that symbols can be interpreted by non-intentional systems. 
For example, Dennett [1971] (p. 12) and [1978] (p. 123) argues that AI research "takes out 
intelligence loans" by breaking down the problem of simulating intelligence into smaller prob-
lems which are postulated, for the time being, to have been solved by subprograms having, 
again for the time being, intentionality. This loan must be repaid later on by filling in each of 
these subprograms by real mechanical procedures, presumably by repeating the process, i.e. 
breaking the subprograms down into even smaller programs which are, for the time being, sup-
posed to be intelligent. Similarly, Fodor [1968] argues that when we tie our shoes, there is a lit-
tle man in our head which applies instructions about how to tie our shoes. The homunculus is a 
set of psychological faculties (p. 65), the instructions are elementary operations executed 
mechanically by our brain (p. 66). The intended analogy between mind/brain and computer 
software/hardware is clear. 
How is one to criticize the position taken by Dennett and Fodor? Three moves can be 
made in the critique. Interestingly, the third move take us back to the concept of a state dis-
cussed in chapter 1 and argued to be inapplicable to at least one psychological process in 
chapter 2. 
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The first move is that there is no psychological theory even remotely similar to the one 
Dennett and Fodor envisage. But of course, this can be written off as an irrelevant detail which 
is contingent upon the current state of scientific knowledge. Critique of the picture must show 
that the account is wrong in principle. Still, we may remark that a loan must be repaid, and if 
then debtor waits too long with even an initial repaiment, his credentials are doubted. 
But there are more principled criticisms. The second move, then, takes its clue from Ryle 
[1949). If intelligence is the application of instructions, why are we not aware of applying 
instructions? Ryle (p. 29), and, following him, Fodor [1968] (p. 68-69); answer this by assum-
ing that the application of instructions goes on unconsciously. They then merrily proceed to the 
third move in the argument. Before following them, I want to draw attention to a problem 
raised by this answer, which is that no reasons have been given why we would be unaware of 
the application of some instructions but aware of others. In general, the postulated unconscious 
application of rules is much faster than the conscious application of rules, so that efficiency con-
siderations would favor total unconsciousness. This point has been raised by Dreyfus [1979] (p. 
106) and will be taken up briefly in section 3.5. Here, I merely point out that no· AI researcher 
has (to my knowledge) answered this challenge. 
Now for the third and essential move. If intelligence is the application of instructions, 
then, just as for any application of rules, this can be done in an intelligent or stupid manner. In 
order to apply the rules intelligently, we need a higher order intelligence which, if it is of the 
same nature as the lower order intelligence, applies rules and therefore requires a still higher 
order intelligence, etc. (Ryle [1949], p. 28-31). This reasoning takes us back to the infinite 
series of homunculi. 
Fodor has an answer to this. First of all, he says, the instructions for applying X are the 
instructions for doing X well ( [1968], p. 73). Therefore, we do not get a regress by having to 
postulate instructions for applying instructions well. Secondly, there must be instructions, for if 
we can say of an activity X that there is a way to do it, then there is an answer to the question 
"How does one do X?"' ([1968], p. 74) In other words, if it makes sense to say that there is a 
way to do X, there is a description of X, even though the actor may not be aware of the descrip-
tion and may not be able to explicate how he does X. 
Now, the description applied by a homunculus must be explicit. This is so when the 
homunculus is a computer program, but this is also the case when it is a homunculus postulated 
by scientific psychology. Science searches for explicit descriptions. When a description of the 
how of an act has been given which is not communicable, or not applicable to different 
instances of the act, or does not mention all relevant data about the environment, in a scientific 
sense no description has been found yet. This observation allows us to conclude that there is at 
least one psychological process for which no finite series of progressively simpler homunculi 
can be postulated: Explication. There are no explicit descriptions which any of these homunculi 
can apply in the case of explication. So in the case of explication, the shift from a homunculus 
who interprets psychological states to a homunculus who applies instructions does not work. It is 
important to see that this shift of focus does not work, not because there is an infinite regress of 
homunculi, but because there is not even one homunculus. In the case of explication, the series 
of homunculi is empty. It makes sense to postulate a homunculus when the process it must exe-
cute is a process of which it makes sense to say that it has states. If we cannot say of a process 
that it is in a state, there is no explicit description of it. Explication is one of the things which 
an agent can do of which he cannot say how he does it and of which, contra Fodor, there is no 
definite answer to the question, "How does one do it?"' 6 
6. Fodor [1983] has turned to the opinion that higher mental processes are not explicitly describable. In oth-
er words, Fodor thinks Dennett cannot repay his intelligence loans. This is consistent with the view Fodor 
expressed 15 years earlier, that there must be a description of process X if it makes sense to ask how X is ex-
ecuted. Apparently, in his [1983] Fodor thinks that there is no way in which one can be said to execute 
higher mental processes, at least not in the same sense as one can say that there is a way of tying one's shoe-
strings. I return to Fodor's view at the end of section 4.2. 
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It is good to step back at this point and review the argument. The question to be answered is 
whether (2") is true, viz. whether semantic engines can be in states with representational con-
tent. Semantic engines are automated, sound axiom systems and if the question is answered 
affirmitavely, then "representational content" is construed as synonymous to "interpretation" in 
the predicate logic sense. This equivocation leads in human beings to the need for a homunculus 
who assigns representational content (an interpretation of the symbols) to mental states. Since 
the homunculus must be capable of having states with representational content as well, we get 
an infinite regress. Fodor and Dennett seek a way out of this regress by viewing "interpretation" 
and therefore "having a representational content" in the case of automated systems in a pro-
cedural manner. The representational content of a mental state (and process) is interpreted by a 
homunculus which is simpler than the homunculus whose mental states (and processes) are 
implemented. Mathematical niceties about the conditions under which a decreasing series of 
numbers is finite appart, this is taken as an argument for the fact that the regress is not infinite. 
But this way out depends upon the assumption that the executed processes have explicit descrip-
tions which can be executed, and for at least one mental process, this has been shown (not pro-
ven) not to be the case (or highly counterintuitive, very implausible). We can therefore wind up 
the argument by concluding that in at least one important case representational content is not the 
same as interpretation in the predicate logic sense. This warrants the conclusion that "represen-
tational content" and "interpretation" are not synonymous. In the simulation of a mental state, 
we cannot put the representational content of the mental state at the place of the question mark 
in figure 1. Figure 2 must therefore be wrong. 
But we are not yet at the end of the resources mustered by the proponents of the idea that states 
in a semantic engines have representational content. Pylyshyn ([1980], p. 443 and [1984], pp. 44 
ff.) argues that a state in a process has representational content if we miss generalizations about 
the process when we don't make the assumption that it has representational content. Since, he 
says, we miss generalizations about cognitive simulations when we do not assume that they have 
representational content, they must have representational content. 
I have two objections to this viewpoint. First, if I believe that it rains, the content of my 
mental state is that it rains. The state has this content, not because someone else can only make 
sense of my behavior if he attributes that content to my state, but because I have the belief that 
it is raining ( cf. Searle [1980b], p. 453). In fact, I may show no behaviour at all to make sense 
of, so no generalizations need be made. And I still can have mental states with representational 
content when I show no behavior. 
Secondly, Pylyshyn has not shown that we miss generalizations about cognitive simulation 
programs if we describe then in mechanistic terms. We miss generalizations if we describe them 
at the level of bit" operations (Pylyshyn [1984], p. 27), but this is true of every computation, 
including simulations of thunderstorms or mental states. We can capture generalizations about a 
computation at any of the levels at which we can meaningfully describe a computer. To see this, 
let us look a bit closer at the nature of computation and simulation. 
When I compute the value of an arbitrary mathematical function f for an argument a with 
pencil and paper, I write down a series of symbols on paper which can be interpreted in an 
abstract universe of mathematical objects (figure 4). 
b I interpretation function sym o s mathematical objects 
Figure 4. 
If I compute the pressure of a gas from its volume and temperature, the symbols (e.g. P, v and 
T) can be interpreted in a universe which is an abstract representation of the gas. The symbols 
are interpreted in an abstraction of the real gas. Irrelevant details, measurement errors, random 
fluctuations etc. are abstracted away (figure 5). If I subsequently compute another P from 
another V and T, I engage in a simulation of a process. I have simulated the process by 
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abstraction interpretation P, V, T mathematical objects ------gas 
Figure 5. 
computing two states in it. A simulation thus consists of a time-ordered sequence of configura-
tions like the one shown in figure 5. Note, incidentally, that the speed by which a configuration 
of P, V and T on the left-hand side of figure 5 is replaced by a new configuration is very much 
slower than the speed at which the states of the gas which they represent follow each other up. 
Also, to reach a new P, V and T, many intermediate computational .states occur which have no 
interpretation in the abstract model or the gas. Both these points are typical for simulations. 
The implementation medium in these computations consists of myself and the pencil and 
paper I use. To be able to carry out the computation, I, as part of the implementation medium, 
must be able to recognize and manipulate symbols. This is interpretation in the procedural 
sense, which must be distinguished from interpretation in the predicate logic sense. In order not 
to confuse the two senses of intepretation, I will call the procedural one execution. We now 
have figure 6. 
interpretation 
P, v, T mathematical objects abstraction ------gas 
execution 
implementation medium 
Figure 6. 
When we automate the computation, the implementation medium is replaced by a machine. The 
description of the computation is then broken down in simple steps, which may be called sub-
routines, To picture this, we imagine figure 6 duplicated as many times as the number of steps 
needed to complete the computation, and connect each picture (except the lasLone) with the 
next by the name of the computational step executed. As in the manual case, the sequence of 
states on the left-hand side of the figure evolves much slower than that on the right hand side, 
and between two computational states S 1 and S 2 which represent states of the gas, there are 
intervening states which have no interpretation in the gas. When we make a cross-section of the 
computational sequence at the left hand side of figure 6 (perpendicular to the paper), we get 
figure 7. 
subroutine 1 subroutine 2 P1, V1, T1 -------'- P2, V2, T2 ------=c.__ 
Figure 7. 
Each P 1 , v,, T, represents a state in the gas. Intervening between these states, there may be con-
figurations of P, V and T which are meaningless as far as the simulation is concerned, but 
which are required in order to execute the computation in non-zero but finite time in the imple-
mentation medium. Each subroutine is an execution of a series of instructions. 
Now, the subroutines in a computation are usually broken down in smaller chunks, each of 
which takes one state of the subroutine .computation to the next state. Zooming in on subroutine 1, 
for example, we see figure 8. At this greater level of computational detail, there are more state 
variables than just P, V and T. This is represented by adding X and Y as state variables to the 
computation of P 2 , V2, T 2 from P 1, V~> T 1• Step 1 starts with P 1, V 1 and T 1 as values for P, V 
and T and initializes the variables X and Y to X 0 and Y0 • It delivers X 1, ••• , T 11 as values of its 
state variables, which are given to step 2, etc. At no moment have X and Y any meaning in 
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subroutine 1 PI, VI, Tl ------------------------~~----------------?2, V2, T2 
X0 , Y0 , P 1, V 1, T1 
step 1 
Figure 8. 
terms of the abstract model of the gas, and only at the beginning and end of subroutine 1 have 
P, V, and T a meaning. 
The breaking down of steps in smaller steps is continued until elementary computer 
instructions are reached. We thus get a hierarchical computation structure, in which each level 
of the hierarchy is intepreted procedurally, or executed, by the level below. How this is in fact 
done is described very well in Tanenbaum [1978]. 
We now have a two-dimensional picture of simulation. In one dimension, shown in figure 
6, symbols are interpreted in a standard predicate logic way in an abstract structure. The second 
dimension of simulation is a hierarchy of temporally ordered steps, each lower level of which 
executes the steps above. We can now turn to Pylyshyn 's claim that we would miss generaliza-
tions about cognitive simulations when we do not attribute representational content to them. 
From the above account it is immediately apparent that we miss generalizations about the 
computation at any level of abstraction. When the computation has been broken down into n 
levels, a description at level i misses generalizations which can be stated at one of the other 
n -1 levels. Therefore, to say that the description at level i misses a generalization does not 
invalidate that description. It merely needs to be supplemented, depending upon one's purposes, 
by descriptions at other levels. 
Secondly, the only interesting generalizations to be made about the computation from the 
simulation point of view are those made at the highest level in figure 6, and made in terms of 
the abstract model of the subject of simulation. All levels downward from P, V and T in figure 
6 are irrelevant as far as the subject of study is concerned. Conversely, without changing any-
thing in the implementation, we can reinterpret the symbols P, V and T and come up with a dif-
ferent simulation. At a certain level of abstraction the behavior of a hydraulic system is 
described by the same equations as the behavior of an electric network and a simulation of a 
process in a hydrau lie system can therefore be reinterpreted in an electric system. The imp le-
mentation medium and the subject of simulation being so independent of each other, the fact 
that we need certain concepts (like representational contents, for example) to describe generali-
zations about the abstract model of the subject says nothing about the implementation. It only 
says something about the abstract model (and, hopefully, about the subject itself). 
I conclude therefore that Pylyshyn has not given a reason to assign a representational con-
tent to automatic formal systems. ( 1 "), which says that semantic engines have representational 
content, is therefore unfounded. 
As a suggestion why so much mental energy is spent on the idea that automatic formal systems 
have states with representational content, I offer the following. Pylyshyn, Dennett and Hauge-
land (and perhaps Fodor) may have been misled by our using antropomorphic terms like 
"knowing," "believing," "missing," and "desiring" in our descriptions of computations. But the 
reason we do this is just that it is convenient, not that it is true. We have a deep-seated prefer-
ence for animistic thinking which we share with other cultures (Hunnings [1972]). Descriptions 
of computations which do not use them are difficult to read. Given these temptations, it is 
perhaps good to remind oneself of a warning Jefferson gave of the danger of anthropomorphic 
thinking. 
What I fear is that a great many airy theories will arise in the attempt to persuade us against 
our better judgement. We have had a hard task to dissuade man from reading qualities of 
human mind in animals. I see a new and great danger threatening -that of anthoropomorphiz-
ing the machine. (Jefferson [1949], p. 1110) 
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Animistic attributions are convenient when they are used metaphorically, but we should realize 
that they are just colorful words which play no explanatory role in the description of the compu-
tation. 
3.4. Searle 
Searle [1980] describes what has since come to be known as the Chinese Room Experiment. 7 A 
man sits in a blinded room and receives three pieces of paper through a hole in the wall. The 
first contains a story written in English, the second a story written in Chinese and the third a set 
of instructions, written in English, to manipulate the Chinese characters. The man is a native 
speaker of English but does not understand Chinese. He is not even sure that the Chinese text is 
written in Chinese and not in another exotic language. He is now given pieces of paper contain-
ing 1. questions in English about the story, the answers to which he has to write down and give 
to his interrogators outside the room and 2. questions written in Chinese, from which he has to 
produce new Chinese texts using the original Chinese story and the symbol-manipulating pro-
gram. His interrogators outside the room know that he answers Chinese questions about a 
Chinese story in Chinese. But as far as the man is concerned, he is just manipulating squiggles. 
He gets so dexterious at this that his interrogators notice no difference in speed with which he 
puts out English answers and Chinese answers. With respect to the Chinese text, Searle says, 
the man in the room is in the same position as a computer executing a program; with respect to 
the English text, however, he is in the same position as any other native speaker of English. 
Searle then discusses the relevance of this example to the claims made by what he calls 
strong AI research. The claims of strong AI research are that 
1. A computer programmed in a way similar to the man in the room understands the Chinese 
story, and 
2. That that program in some sense explains that understanding. 
I follow his discussion for the first claim only. 
Searle's response to the first claim is that, obviously, the man does not understand 
Chinese, at least not in the way that he understands the English story. Since the man in the 
room is doing essentially the same as a computer, Searle concludes that the first claim of strong 
AI research is false. Put differently, the TT is not a test to find out whether someone under-
stands a piece of text. 
Secondly, Searle says, an underlying assumption of the TT and of AI research, which he 
calls the strong AI thesis is hereby refuted too. The strong AI thesis says that human intelligence 
is the only biological process which is implementation-independent, i.e. can be realized in dif-
ferent media. In the words of Hofstadter [1979], mind is "skimmable" from brain. 8 In the fol-
lowing paragraphs, I sum up Searle's discussion of counterarguments to this refutation before 
evaluating his own standpoint. Searle discusses four major and two minor counterarguments to 
this claim. The first minor argument is that we only have behavior to go on if we want to justify 
attribution of intelligence to people and machines alike, so that if we refuse to attribute intelli-
gence to the one, we have to refuse to attribute .it to the other. Searle's refutation of this has 
been discussed above already (2.2). The point is not how we know that other people are intelli-
gent (nor how we justify that claim) but what I am attributing when I attribute intelligence to 
them. 
The second minor counterargument is that some day, we may be able to produce an artifi-
cial intelligence in a medium radically different from digital or analog computers. This is virtu-
ally identical to the only positive argument Turing gives in support of his claim. My answer to it 
7. The following description deviates slightly from Searle's description. 
8. It is inconsitent with the "skimmability theses," to say the least, when after a number of contorted ver-
sions of the TC thesis, Hofstadter [1979] (p. 579) comes up ·with the -AI thesis: As the intelligence of 
machines evolves, its underlying mechanisms will gradually converge to the mechanisms underlyin2: human 
intelligence.-
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is given in 3.1: We_may be able to produce an intelligence in a novel way, but if the result is 
intelligent in the way human beings are, we cannot describe its intelligence explicitly. Searle's 
answer is that in the case that the medium is radically different from a digital computer, his 
argument does not apply. The Chinese Room argument is directed at the claim that computers 
can be intelligent, have cognitive states, merely by executing a program. When that claim is 
replaced by another one, the goal of AI research is trivialized by "redefining it as whatever 
artificially produces and explains cognition" (Searle [1980a], p. 298). 
Implicitly, this is an admission by Searle that he has not refuted the strong AI thesis. He 
admits that he has shown at most that intelligence cannot be implemented in computers. But the 
thesis of implementation-independence of intelligence is stronger than that. It says that intelli-
gence may be realized in other media than the brain. If it cannot be realized in a computer, 
then maybe it can be realized in yet other media. 
The four major counterarguments are as follows. 
1. The systems reply says that the man in the room may not understand Chinese, but the sys-
tem as a whole does. Searle answers that we may dispense with the system and let the man 
internalize all the squiggle-manipulating rules. He then is the system, but still does not 
understand Chinese. 
2. The robot reply says that we may add sensors and effectors to the linguistic in- and output 
organs of the system, so that it can act, talk, see, walk, etc. Such a robot, it is claimed, 
would have mental states. Searle's answer is that we can, again, put a man in a room and 
feed him with all sorts of incomprehensible instructions which he has to mindlessly exe-
cute, while outside the room and unbeknown to him we connect the streams of symbols 
going in and out of the room with sensors and effectors. Then the mental states of the man 
are not of the relevant type and the robot he implements does not have mental states. 
3. The brain simulation reply is the ultimate TT: Simulate all events in the brain down to the 
neuron level. The resulting system will then think. Searle replies that the simulation only 
simulates the formal structure of the sequence of neuron firings and would lack the "causal 
powers" of the brain and would therefore not think. 
4. The combination reply, finally, proposes to combine all the foregoing replies into one. A 
robot i-n the form of the brain is put in a skull and connected to a computer programmed 
to simulate the firing of synapses. If we think of this as one system, it thinks. Searle's 
answer is that we would attribute intentionality to it, penJing some reason not to. One rea-
son not to is that we discover its program. If we know how to account for its behavior 
without assuming that it has mental states, we would not attribute mental states to it. We 
can instruct a man in a room to execute the program, and that man, nor the system he is 
part of, would not have the relevant mental states. 
The first evaluative remark to be made about these counterarguments and Searle's replies is that 
it is increasingly hard to have any reliable intuitions about them. For example, if the man learns 
the squiggle-manipulating program by heart and can apply it as fast as he can speak English, 
what is the difference with someone who learned Chinese consciously by memorizing grammar 
rules and applying them? If he learns to understand Chinese in the second case, why not in the 
first? Or if the brain is duplicated in a material which behaves in the same way down to the 
neuron level, what is the difference between a real brain and its simulation? If the processes are 
similar in all describable aspects, why should the brain think and not its duplicate? The original 
intuition. from which the Chinese room experiment derives its appeal, the difference between 
symbol-manipulation and human understanding, is snowed under by a shower of confusing 
details. 
The second remark I want to make about Searle's answers is that there is a contradiction hid-
den in them. Uncovering this contradiction will make clear why Searle's answers to the coun-
terarguments are weak as well as poin~ out what the answer to the counterexamples should be. 
The contradiction is hidden in the unanalyzed concepts of "formal program" on the one 
hand and "causal powers of the brain" on the other. Searle compares the causal powers of the 
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brain to produce mental processes with the causal power of H 20 to produce the liquid properties 
of water. Just as "the liquidity of water is not to be found at the level of the individual 
molecule," so "the visual perception [is not] to be found at the level of the individual neuron or 
synapse" (Searle [1983], p.268). In general, 
"the surface structure is both caused by the behaviour of micro-elements, and at the same time 
is realised in the system that is made up of the micro-elements" (Searle [1984], p. 21, Searle's 
italics). 
If we look closer at this analogy, we will see, first, that it breaks down, and second, that the 
concepts of "caused by" and "realized in" are confused. When we remove the confusion, the 
contradiction alluded to emerges. 
The analogy breaks down because the relation between liquidity and the microstructure of 
water is not of the same type as the relation between a visual experience and the microstructure 
of our brain. If a system is liquid, it is liquid because it can be divided in subsystems (its 
microstructure) whose state evolution functions and interaction work together to produce output 
when given certain input. We call that input/output behavior "liquidity." But if a system has a 
visual experience (I, looked at in the third person), its microstructure (neurons, retina etc. with 
their state evolution functions and interaction patterns) do not produce behavior which we, the 
observers of the system, call "visual experience." There is no behavior called "visual experi-
ence." The subject can report on visual experience, but this is verbal behavior, not visual 
behavior (whatever that may be), let alone visual experience. The microstructure of neurons, 
retina etc. does not produce input/output behavior which can be classified by the observers as a 
"visual experience"; in contrast, the microstructure of water does produce I/0 behavior which 
can be classified by observers as liquidity. Whatever behavior is observed by external observers 
is not visual experience, while whatever is observed by the subject himself is not the behavior 
of his neurons and retina, but the objects or events which the experimentor displays to him. This 
difference between the relation between liquidity and the microstructure of water on the one 
hand and visual experience and the microstructure of the brain on the other, is obscured by 
Searle. 
Secondly, the phrases "caused by" and "realized in" obscure a distinction which ought to 
be made in this context. When the liquidity of water is explained by the microstructure of 
water, there are two different levels of abstraction, as illustrated in figure 9. 
explains abstract H 20 ----~----- parameter ranges---------- liquidity 
Figure 9. 
The microstructure of water explains why certain parameters describing the behavior of water 
fall in certain ranges. These parameters with these ranges are an abstract, explicit description of 
what in daily life goes under the name "liquidity." Now, the explication of the common concept 
of liquidity as certain explicitly defined parameters falling in certain ranges does not exactly 
coincide with the unexplicated concept of liquidity. Certain viscous substances will be called 
liquid in the abstract sense which no one would call liquid in the common sense of the word, so 
the abstraction applies to objects to which the common sense concept does not apply. Con-
versely, with the common sense concept goes a halo of poetic associations and memories (a gui-
tar solo was once described to me as "wet") which are deemed irrelevant to the behavior of 
liquid substances and are abstracted from. So the intuitive concept applies to objects and 
processes to which the abstraction does not apply. 
Given the mismatch between intuitive concept and abstraction, one can for any abstraction 
ask whether it adequately captures the part of the intuition ·we want to characterize. We can 
relegate some parts of the intuitive concept to irrelevance and we can adapt its meaning to that 
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of the abstraction, but intuitive it remains, and we can always ask the question how close the 
match between intuition and abstraction is. The fundamental problem here is that there can be 
no explicit proof that the two concepts coincide. Such a proof would forestall doubts about the 
validity of the abstraction as an abstraction of the intuitive concept. This is the problem which is 
central to the Turing-Church thesis: It cannot be proved, only made plausible, that the concept 
8f a recursive function is an adequate explication of the concept of an algorithmic function. 
Now, Searle's relations of "caused by" and "realized in" are represented by the edge 
labelled "explains" in figure 9. Or, to be more precise, the behavior characterized by the 
parameters in question is caused by and realized in H 20. What is not caused by and realized in 
H 20 is the liquidity which is the meaning of the intuitive concept at the right hand side of figure 
9. Searle confuses the matter by identifying an intuitive concept with its abstraction. 
The distinction is important in the present discussion, for it allows us to state what is 
wrong with the analogy between H 20 /liquidity and neurons/ mind. Consider what the diagram 
should look like in the case of visual perception (figure 1 0). 
explains 
neurons &c.--~---- brain behavior ????????? ------- visual experience 
Figure 10. 
Brain behavior is caused by and realized in the brain, but what is the relation between brain 
(and retina) behavior and visual experience? Certainly not one of abstraction. And yet visual 
experi.-~nces must take place in the common sense world, while brain behavior takes place in the 
abstract world of science. A fairly standard answer in cognitive psychology is that the question 
marks should be replaced by a series of systems which, with respect to the behavior of the enor-
mous heap of 1010 neurons (with 10800 potential connections) are abstractions, in such a manner 
that the system with the highest level of abstraction is also an abstract description of the visual 
experience. I will not pursue this answer but simply note that whatever is filled in for the ques-
tion marks, it cannot change the fact that the visual experience to be explained takes place in 
the common sense world just as the intuitive concept of liquidity has a meaning in the common 
sense world. 
The conclusion is that whatever is caused by and realized in the brain, it is not the visual 
experience which the subject reports on, but an abstraction of it. The corresponding conclusion 
in the case of water is not very disturbing, for it is we, not the water, who produce the vague-
ness of the everyday concept. But in the case of the visual experience the analogous conclusion 
is disturbing, for it is presumably our brain which produces the vagueness of common visual 
experience. As scientists we should therefore try something which in the case of water we do 
not have to undertake: Explain the relation between the vague common visual experience and 
the microstructure of the brain. But a glance at figure 10 (and at my argument) shows that the 
visual experience is "out of reach" of explicit descriptions, so to speak. 
The application to Searle's relation of "caused by and realized in" is simple. If we know 
that two events or processes are related· causally, it must be because we have an explicit descrip-
tion of them which states what the causal relation is. A consequence of the above argument is 
therefore that the brain and visual experience cannot be causally related, at least not in the sense 
which we usually give to that term in science. This is not to deny that there is a connection 
between the brain, retina, etc. and visual experience; it "merely" says that this relation is not 
explicitly describable and therefore cannot be called causal. 
The contradiction in Searle's replies is that he cannot both refute the counterargument that 
a simulation of the brain to the smallest level of detail would be conscious and at the same time 
claim that the mind is caused by the brain. The contradiction emerges when the confusion sur-
rounding the concepts of "caused by" and "realized in" is cleared up. 
This conclusion can be rephrased in general terms as the thesis that it is meaningless to say that 
the mind is implementation-dependent. I call a process A implementation-dependent on process 
- 34-
B when any realization of A is necessarily a realization of B as well. The relation between A 
and B is as between the two levels of computation in figure 8. In figure 8, each lower level pro-
cess implements the processes above it. Implementation-dependence of process at level n on a 
process at level m, m <n, is the phenomenon that each time the process at level n is realized, 
the process at level m is necessarily realized as well. 
It is this claim which Searle makes with respect to mental processes and brain processes. 
My critique of it is not that the claim is false, but that it is meaningless, since a presupposition 
is not fulfilled which would make Searle's claim have a truth-value: Some mental processes, like 
visual experience (and explication, as was argued in chapter 2), are not explicitly describable. 
This view of the matter also applies to the strong AI thesis which Searle attempts to refute. 
Just as it is meaningless to say that mind depends essentially on the brain for its implementa-
tion, so it is meaningless to say that the mind is independent of implementation in the brain. 
The strong AI thesis is not so much refuted as rendered meaningless. 
My view of the Chinese room experiment should by now also be clear: The process by 
which the man manipulates squiggles is explicitly described, and therefore does not describe a 
mental process. This view is unaffected by the counterexamples discussed by Searle. 
3.5. Digression: Implementation-independence and AI methodology 
I want to digress briefly in this section from the main theme, the possibility of MI, with a 
methodological look at the thesis of the implementation-independence of the mind which is cen-
tral to current AI research. I start with two definitions. 
Let me define natural science as the study of the state evolution function of systems as 
they are encountered in nature, and engineering science as the study of the way in which a state 
evolution function thought to be desirable can implemented. For example, high-energy physics, 
neurology, and linguistics are natural sciences, because the behavior of the systems they study is 
described as it is encountered in nature. Bridges, boats, airplanes and houses are systems stu-
died by engineering science, because their behavior is deemed desirable by people. There are 
various mixtures of the two types of science in practice. For example, to be able to conduct 
experiments in high energy physics, a lot of engineering science is used, and in the study of air-
foils, new facts are discovered about the natural phenomenon of turbulence. But the distinction 
between the two research goals is clear: In natural science, behavior found in nature is studied, 
in engineering science, behavior desired by man is studied. The behavior studied by natural sci-
ence may be very undesirable, and the behavior studied by engineering science may never have 
occurred before in nature. 
Given these differences in research goals, let me place the notion of implementation-
independence in perspective. In engineering science, it is immaterial how a state evolution func-
tion is implemented, as long as the implementation satisfies certain engineering standards. 
Important engineering standards are cost-effectiveness (the implementation medium should be 
cheap), reliability (few breakdowns should occur), robustness (it should function in a wide 
range of environments) and, above all, usefulness, (the artifact should satisfy a desire of man). 
All these desiderata are external to the process studied, and they motivate the choice of imple-
mentation medium -cheap, strong, reliable, etc. Implementation-independence of the desired 
behavior is thus a central concept in engineering science because it gives us a freedom of choice 
of implementation materials. Note that implementation-independence "disembodies" the func-
tion to be implemented and therefore requires a clear understanding of the function to be imple-
mented, independently of the implementation medium. It makes no sense to try to implement a 
machine which "more or less can fly." This ties in with the presupposition of explicit describa-
bility argued to be necessary for implementation-independence above. (It may be the case, as 
often happens in computer science, that people have only a vague idea of what they want. Then 
prototypes of the desired machine are built and given to the user to play with, so that he can 
clearly say what he wants. This statement of requirements is then used to draw up a contract 
which states dearly which functions the desired machine should fulfil.) 
In natural science, implementation-independence plays no role except in reasoning by 
I -
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analogy. When the behavior of electricity is studied, we want to know how electricity is realized 
in nature, not how we can implement analogous behavior in a system of water pipes. We may 
try to describe the behavior of one process by borrowing a description known to describe similar 
behavior (see Harre [1970] for a classification of this type of reasoning). But the research goal 
rules out implementation-independence as an interesting phenomenon. Note that the behavior of 
the process whose natural implementation is studied, is often ill-understood. Natural science 
starts with ill-understood state evolution functions of systems as they are found in nature, not 
with clearly stated desired behavior. 
A science of mind should therefore try to explicate the currently ill-understood state evolu-
tion function of mental processes and then study the natural implementation of this in the brain. 
Assume for the sake of the argument that this research goal is attainable and that all that has 
been said about explicit describability in this thesis is mistaken. What can we then say about AI 
research from this methodological point of view? 
AI research tries to study ill-understood mental functions independently of the implementa-
tion. It thus combines natural and engineering science research methods, but combines them 
only partly. From natural science it adopts the study of ill-understood functions, and from 
engineering science it adopts the idea of studying behavior in an artificial implementation. This 
does not bode well for research results. From a natural science point of view, is the imple-
mented function (which has been explicated some way) an interesting abstraction of the function 
found in nature? Does the implementation tell us anything about the natural implementation of 
the function? Debugging a program until it works does not give any clue as to the answer. To 
some extent, this criticism extends to any study of natural functions by simulation, but the initial 
vagueness and the distance from the end-result to the simulated behavior seems the largest in AI 
research. ( Cf. McDermott [1976] for some comments upon the scientific value of AI programs.) 
From an engineering point of view, other questions can be asked. Is the function desirable? Is 
the implementation cost-effective, reliable, robust? The answer to these questions is negative in 
the majority of AI programs (with some noteable exceptions, like the expert system DENDRAL 
and the symbolic integration program MACSYMA). 
All of this may be written off as unfair and premature criticism of a young discipline. But 
the analysis of the previous paragraphs shows at least that the question of the justification of the 
research method in AI is still open, and that it is up to AI researchers to provide one. (Ringle 
[1983] and Hayes [1984] make some attempt in this direction, but their arguments are far from 
conclusive and the mixture of natural and engineering science at issue is put into question by 
Sharkey & Pfeifer [1984]). It also shows that the AI mix of natural and engineering science 
depends crucially upon the adoption of the idea of implementation-independence from engineer-
ing science. As long as this mix of methods leads to results which fall below the standards of 
natural science as well as engineering science, there is reason to believe that the strong AI thesis 
of the implementation-independence of the mind is a bad idea to base a research method on, 
and the longer this situation continues, the more weight must be attached to this reason. 
3.6. Dreyfus 
Dreyfus [1979] (pp. 1 00-129) gives a number of arguments why computers cannot be intelligent 
which are similar in intent but different in structure to mine. On pp. 100-129 of his [1979], 
Dreyfus gives arguments why he thinks computers cannot execute a process he calls "perspicu-
ous grouping" of data. I summarize these arguments first and then discuss them. Dreyfus 
assumes that human beings can perspicuously group data, while computers manipulate discrete 
symbols (ibid., p. 128). This contrast between pespicuous grouping and symbol-manipulation is 
analyzed into three elements, zeroing in, ambiguity tolerance, and insight. 
1. People are able to zero in on a promising aspect of the situation. Chess players do this, 
without being aware of counting out alternatives. If they did count out alternatives uncons-
ciously, then this must be an enormously efficient computation and it seems weird that 
shortly before reaching a determinate output, the computation stops being unconsciouss 
and switches to a slow, cumbersome, consciouss mode (ibid. p 1 06). After zeroing in, a 
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chess player counts out the (relatively) few alternatives for the move he wants to make. 
Doing this, he relies on a background of past experience at the "fringe of his conscious-
ness." Computers cannot do this, Dreyfus says, because they must start counting out alter-
natives in a step-by step manner already during the process of "zeroing in." 
2. Human beings tolerate ambiguity and resolve it by their sense of the situation. Many 
natural language expressions, for example, are highly ambiguous , but most of the logi-
cally possible interpretations do not even come up for consideration because the expres-
sions appear in a context. Computers, by contrast, must manipulate information in 
context-free bits and can therefore not resolve the ambiguity. 
3. The third component of perspicuous grouping is termed alternatively insight, seeing the 
structure of the problem, restructuring the problem, or seperating the essential from the 
inessential aspects of the situation. This is a major element of human creative thinking and 
is contrasted with the way a computer must search a space of problem situations. A com-
puter cannot seperate the essential from the inessential unless the programmer introduces 
the distinction in the first place, either in the program itself, or in a planning program, or 
in a meta-planning program, etc. (ibid. p.118). 
Some obvious differences between these arguments and mine are that 1. Dreyfus' argu-
ment applies to computers, not to machines in general; and that 2. Dreyfus argues that comput-
ers cannot perspicuously group data, not that they cannot explicate. 
A consequence of the first difference is that my argument applies not only to the current 
generation of universal digital computers, but also to non-standard computing devices as the 
connection machine and the Boltmann machine. 
Connected to this is that Dreyfus's argument does not rest on an explicit description of 
those properties of a computer which prevent it from executing the processes Dreyfus says it 
cannot execute ( cf. Buchanan [1973]. p. 21). The observation that these processes have resisted 
automation up till now is not sufficient to warrant the conclusion that they cannot be 
automated. 9· For example from the fact that a computer processes information in a discrete 
manner by manipulating context-free bits or by searching a space of alternatives it does not fol-
low, without further argument, that it cannot zero in, resolve ambiguity, or (re)structure a prob-
lem. To a certain extent, these processes have been executed by computers, but with problems 
of any size the computations are crushed under a mountain of alternatives which have to be con-
sidered explicitly. To show that the combinatorial explosion of alternatives is not a technical 
problem but one of principle, more argument is needed. 10 
A consequence of the second difference between Dreyfus' argument and mine is that his 
argument is more controversial and much harder to get right, because the concept of perspicu-
ous grouping is vaguer than that of explication. Despite this extra effort, it would still share a 
deficiency with my own argument, viz. that there are people who are not able to execute the 
relevant process. Some people with mental illnesses cannot perspicuously group data and 
thereby fall outside the domain to which the argument applies. Such people execute processes 
which probably are even less amenable to explicit description than explication, but because we 
don't have first-hand experience of those processes, it is even harder to find counterintuitive 
consequences of the assumption that those processes are explicitly describable. 
A final difficulty with Dreyfus' argument is that perspicuous grouping is not defined 
independently of the contrast with computers. By not separating the different parts of the argu-
ment, accepting or rejecting it becomes a kind of all-or-nothing affair in which it is hard to say 
with which part of the· argument one disagrees. 
9. See note 2. 
10. If we restrict ourselves to algorithmic processes, the theory of NP-completeness could be used (Garey & 
Johnson [1979]). But even there it can be shown at most that if an algorithm for a certain problem can be 
found whose execution time does not grow exponentially with time. then a host of other hard problems are 
solvable in non-exponential time as well. 
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A difference of another order between Dreyfus' argument and mine is that he imputes a series 
of questionable assumptions (called the biological, psychological, epistemological and ontologi-
cal assumption) to AI researchers, whereas I do not. In reaction to his book, it was promptly 
denied that AI researchers do in fact entertain those assumptions, or that they need to entertain 
them, or that it was claimed that it is not a bad thing to entertain them, or that they are not 
entertained anymore (Buchanan [1973], Williams [1973], Wilks [1976]). Most of the discussion 
around Dreyfus' arguments has focussed on these assumptions or on the supposed maliciousness 
of his "attack on AI" and this has clouded the important issues mentioned above. 
Dreyfus ends his book with a proposal for an alternative method for psychology based upon 
ideas from phenomenology. I think that it is mistaken to expect results from phenomenological 
research which can be compared significantly with those of science. In particular, I don't fhink 
there exist explicit descriptions relating the results of phenomenological research with those of 
science. I turn to this and some other consequences of my thesis in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Some consequences of the thesis 
After these skirmishes in various directions, I now return to the main theme of this thesis, expli-
cation and explicitness. The conclusion of chapter 2 is that explication is a mental process to 
which the concept of state is not applicable and which is therefore not explicitly describable. 
The main reason for the concept of state being not applicable is that anything about the context 
of explication can be relevant for the outcome of the explication process. In this chapter, this 
result will be expanded to formulate two related standpoints which I call ontological monism 
and epistemological dualism. The claims of these two views follow from the two statements 
below, which in their turn summarize the relevant conclusions from the argument of chapter 2. 
1. Explication is a gradual process. There is no sharp division between explicit descriptions 
and totally inexplicit descriptions. Between these two types of descriptions lies a continu-
ous spectrum of explicitness. 
2. The ability to explicate, as well as individual explication processes, are not explicitly 
describable. Any explicit description of the ability to explicate will fail to capture the 
open-ended quality that the range of situations which can be explicated is not explicitly 
demarcated, and any e:J5plicit description of an individual explication process will fail to 
capture potentially r€?levant aspects of the context of explication (which includes the person 
who does the explicating). 
Statement 2 says in effect that explication is literally inexplicable, and section 1 of this chapter 
explores some reasons why this should be so. The main source of inspiration for this section is 
the philosophy of Heidegger. Section 4.2 then formulates the two thesis connected with the gra-
duality and inexplicability of explication. Section 4.3 then applies this to a very practical affair, 
the use of machines by people. 
4.1. Explication revisited 
In chapter 1, the outcome of an explication process, an explicit -description, was characterized. 
In order to better understand the statement that there are degrees of explicitness, in this section I 
turn to the starting point of explication. If we do this, we are in for some grave problems, for 
suppose that what lies at the start of explication is explicitly describable. Then the explication 
process would be explicitly describable. This contradicts all that has been argued before, so 
that, even if my argument is incorrect, consistency demands that I come up with inexplicit 
descriptions, i.e. descriptions which are incomprehensible, or describe an unrepeatable situa-
tion, or are very context-dependent. Any attempt to say something about the start of the explica-
tion process therefore goes against a conviction which is expressed by the famous words of 
Wittgenstein, 
Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, dariiber muB man schweigen. Wittgenstein [1973], p. 115. 
Against this injunction -against which Wittgenstein was the ftrst to acknowledge that he had 
sinned- I want set the belief expressed by Heidegger that if we don't try to describe what pre-
cedes explication, then we throw away our capacity as human beings to think (Heidegger 
[1959a], p. 25). The motto to be followed then, becomes 
Beweisen liiBt sich in diesem Bereich nichts, aber weisen manches. Heidegger (1957], p. 8. 
The nature of the problems we are likely to encounter is more or less characterized when we 
negate the properties of explicit descriptions, for whatever describes that which explication starts 
with, it must be the opposite of an explicit description. In other words, it must be an incommun-
icable and maximally context-sensitive description of an unrepeatable situation. Each of these 
- 39-
three characteristics implies that one person cannot understand such a description when uttered 
by another. If such a description is understood, it must be understood not to apply to the current 
situation. 1 But if at least that is understood, something has come across, which is impossible by 
definition. So it is understood that even inapplicability to the current situation cannot be under-
stood, etcetera. Looking purely at the logic of totally inexplicit descriptions, the process of 
understanding such descriptions iterates from negation to negation. 2 Totally inexplicit descrip-
tions are inherently instabile; the attempt to understand them never ends. 3 
But this unending character of the search for what precedes explication should not stop us 
from undertaking it. If we do not undertake it, we may forsake, as Heidegger says, what is the 
essense of human existence, the capacity for thought. We can learn two things from Heidegger's 
philosophy which are relevant to the phenomenon of explication. First, Heidegger's analysis of 
human existence reveals some structures in human existence which make human beings the kind 
of beings who can explicate. Second, the analysis of these structures gives some insight into 
what it is that lies at the start of the explication process. I discuss these two points in turn. 
An entity which can explicate is an entity which can carry out a process of which at least 
in the initial phase cannot be said to be a sequence of stares. There is no finite description of 
what the effects of possible inputs on the development of the process and its output will have. In 
other words, we cannot use the language of _states, state evolutions, processes, inputs and out-
puts to describe its peculiarities (the previous sentence, which uses that language, must therefore 
be taken metaphorically). 
One peculiarity of explication is that anything about the environment, including the history 
of the explicating agent, can be relevant to its outcome. That is what makes it so context-
sensitive. Another peculiarity is that to the agent himself it is not exactly clear in advance which 
aspects are relevant (if it were, explication would already have taken place). The act of explica-
tion starts, as it were, from nothing, in the sense that whatever it starts from is not a thing when 
viewed in the way the subject sees it at the start of explication. This is true for someone brood-
ing over the next sentence in a written argument, a photographer looking for the right composi-
tion, right moment and right dynamics of his photo, a mathematician trying to find a proof, a 
programmer trying to locate a bug in a program, or two friends of which each explaines the 
other's moods to the other. In some of these cases, explication goes so far as to lead to an expli-
cit description, and in some of those cases, the clues which lead to the explicit description may 
be described as definite things separable from their environment. But as such they did not lead 
to the explication. On the contrary, it is explication which made them appear as such. For this 
reason, explications of the clues which lead to an explicit description always seem to leave a sig-
nificant but indeterminate residue which also was relevant. 
We can put this in partly in the language of systems theory (as was done in the previous 
paragraph), partly in the language of Heidegger (as will be done in the next). What has just 
been said is that explication literally starts from a significant nothingness. Now, a thing is some-
thing which is conceptually seperable from its environment, can be in a state and can go 
through a process. In short, it is what I have called a system from the first sentence of section 
1.1 up till now. Things may be material, but mental processes or organizations of people, in as 
far as they can be described as systems, are things as \VeiL To say that explication starts with 
I. This phenomenon is used in Buddhist texts in a kind of dialectical progression of statements and their 
contradictions in order to evoke understanding in the reader (e.g. the Heart Surra. Conze [1958]). 
2. This phenomenon is central to Buddhism as well. See Gunaratne [1986]. 
3. The limit of this infinite series is a very special description, a silent expression of unutterable truth. It 
may be. however, that the series does not converge to one limite but has as many limits as there are occa-
sions to be silent. 
As I understand Buddha's meaning there is no formulation of truth called Consumation of Incomparable En-
lightenment. Moreover, the Thatagata has no formulated teaching to enunciate. Wherefore'1 Because the 
Thatagata has said that truth is uncontainable and inexpressible. It neither is nor is it nm. (Diamond Surra. 
Price & Wong Mou-Lam [1969]. 
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nothing is to say that it does not start from a system. To say that it starts with significant noth-
ingness is to say that this, which is not a system, can be highly relevant. 
Changing now to the language of Heidegger's phenomenology, to say that what explication 
starts from is not a thing is to say that it lies beyond the horizon of the current situation. A 
being which can explicate must be open to what is beyond the current horizon; explicating it, it 
is drawn within the horizon and this at the same time opens new horizons. Heidegger calls a 
being which is not simply sensitive to well-described inputs but to the significant nothingness 
beyond the horizon of the current situation a Dasein. A Dasein is a being which is there, which 
is shorthand for "to be in a world and be open to its horizon." Using a language which suggests 
some of the darkness which precedes explication, Heidegger describes it thus: 
Nur auf dem Grunde der urspriinglichen Offenbarkeit des Nichts kann das Dasein des Men-
scherr auf Seiendes zugehen und eingehen. Sofern aber das Dasein seinem Wesen nach zu 
Seiendem, das es nicht ist und das es se1bst ist, sich verha1t, kommt es a1s so1ches Dasein je 
schon aus dem offenbaren Nichts her. 
Da-sein heiBt: Hineingehaltenheit in das Nichts. (Heidegger [1929], p. 114) 
There is an original openness to the situation and its horizon which makes it possible that man 
can be directed at things and that he can be absorbed by his world. This openness precedes in 
the ontological order of things that which it opens up, the everyday world of average-sized dry 
goods. Dasein is open to Nichts or-nothingness. 4 
The image of a horizon may suggest that the source of what comes upon us in the act of 
explication lies tar away. At several places, Heidegger emphasises that the opposite is true: It is 
closer to us than the explicitly described things we put before us. 
Das ontisch Nachste und Bekannte ist das onto1ogisch Fernste, Unerkannte und in seiner onto-
logischen Bedeutung stiindig Ubersehene. ([1927], p. 43) Das Denken ware dann das In-die-
Nahe-kommen zum Fernen. ([1959], p. 43). 
It is so close because it precedes our explicit descriptions and that is why it is so difficult to 
think about. What Heidegger calls thinking is an effort to experience this nothingness in its 
closeness. The reason to attempt to think the unthinkable is that the unthinkable makes it possi-
ble that we dwell with the things ip. the- world, the things we describe by more or less explicit 
descriptions. If we confine ourselves to the explicitly thinkable, Heidegger says, we ignore the 
essence of what makes us human beings, i.e. beings who are there. 
A beginning of an answer to the first question posed above, what kind of being it is that 
can explicate, has been made by saying that it is a Dasein which is open to the significant noth-
ingness beyond the horizon of the current situation; this horizon lies closer to us than whatever 
is described by explicit descriptions. To some people, this is meaningless language. This is as it 
should be, for it would be self-contradictory to describe what precedes explication in explicit 
terms. Being inexplicit, the descriptions we come up with have at least one of the properties of 
not being communicable to all people, or nor being context-independent, or not describing 
repeatable processes. They may therefore strike some people as meaningless. 
The answer could be worked out much more by following the structures of Dasein 
described by Heidegger [1927]. This will not be done here, since it will exceed by far the 
bounds put on this essay. But enough has been said to show that an opening exists which con-
nects the world of science and systems theory with the world of metaphysics and even mysti-
cism. And it is man which is the bridge between the two worlds. 
4. In another context Heidegger calls it emptiness (Heidegger [I 959], p. 108), thus creating a link with Bud-
dhism. 
! -
- 41 -
Something has been said already about the second question, what it is which lies at the 
start of the explication process. It has been described as significwt nothingness; Heidegger uses 
also the term world for it, which is not the totality of systems which are discernable by man, but 
that which precedes the systems thus discerened. Man dwells in a world as a web of meanings 
which point over the current horizon and as a set of familiar ways of acting. Man has to be fam-
iliar with this world in order to describe the things he meets in everyday life ( Duintjer [1966], 
p. 188). Because of this close connectedness between man and world, Heidegger calls Dasein 
In-der- Welt-sein. This does not mean that the world is part of man and is but the projection of 
his ideas, nor that man is in the world as a pen is in a box. We cannot take man out of his 
world as we can take a pen out of a box, and we canot destroy the world as we can stop a 
movie by stopping the projector. What it does mean is that man is ever "outside himself," open 
to the world and acting in it, meeting it and feeling its resistance. On the other hand, the dwel-
ling and acting in the world can only take place "inside the world," in a field provided to him 
by the world (Duintjer, ibid.). This interplay between outside and inside is epitomized by cal-
ling Dasein a Being-in-the-world. 
_ To sum up what has been said so far, explication produces descriptions of systems and takes its 
clues from what lies beyond the horizon of the current situation. What lies beyond the horizon 
is the world we live in. This is so close to us that it precedes explicit description and must be 
described by phrases as "significant nothingness." This account will be extended by one more 
point. 
By definition, the world in the sense Heidegger takes it is not explicitly describable. But 
the world is there before and after we produce an explicit description of one of its aspects. 
Strictly spoken, it is not an "it" at all in the sense that it has a constant identity which endures 
through time and change. The world changes with our explications to form new contexts and 
new horizons, but this, too, is a metaphorical way of using "the·· and "changes," for I am not 
using these words in the meanings they have in "the system changes state." We can put the 
point in a different way by saying that there is always a context to our descriptions from which 
more can be explicated. To any formal language, there is always an informal metalevel. This 
property is bound to the elusiveness of the concepts of world and nothingness. When I explicate 
the concept of a world, I am left with nothing, but it is still there in the background. 
This concludes our detour through Heidegger's philosophy. I will now use this analysis to define 
two standpoints which can serve as a context for the arguments about explication in the previous 
two chapters, ontological monism and epistemological dualism. 
4.2. Ontological monism and epistemological dualism 
In the introduction to this chapter it was noted that explication is a gradual process. In section 
4.1, explication has been described as rising out of the world, which in its turn is described as 
significant nothingness. In section 1.1, systems, which are described by the outcome of an expli-
cation process, were described as any part of reality which we are interested in and which can 
be in a state and go through state changes. Putting this together, there is thus a gradual ontologi-
cal transition between the nothingness we are directed at at the start of explication and the sys-
tems we are describing after explication. The transition is called ontological, for it concerns the 
reality we find ourselves in, not the ideas we have about reality. We have no control over the 
clues which inspire us during explication, so the world with which explication starts is not a 
construct of our mind. It is not part of our imagination. And the systems we describe are not 
figments of our imaginaton either, since they can be observed and experimented with. 
The gradual transiton from the initial nothingness to the explicitly described systems is thus 
a gradation in ways of being. There is no clear line to draw between the nothingness and sys-
tems. On the contrary, there is a surprising agreement between the two. Systems are described 
functionally, by giving a state evolution function which describes the effect of inputs on the 
state and output of the system. Now, it is a peculiarity of state evolution functions that they can, 
in principle, be applied to systems made of different "substance," to use the old-fashioned term. 
or "implementation medium," to use the term common in engineering science. A well-known 
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example, mentioned earlier, is the state evolution function for the behavior of electricity in a 
conductor, which is applicable to the behavior of water through pipes as well. The reason why 
this is so in particular cases or in general does not interest us here. Important for the present 
purpose is that, in principle, any state evolution function may be applicable to any part of 
nature. If a state evolution function is applied to systems of one type of "substance" only, it is 
because we have not ran against examples of a type of system to which it could be applied as 
well. 5 
Dropping the language of substances, state evolution functions describe a system at one 
level of aggregation, and there may be different types of subsystems which can be aggregated to 
form a system which behaves that way. The differences among the subsystems in some way is 
balanced out by the way they are aggregated, so that aggregate systems composed of very dif-
ferent subsystems behave according to the same function. Water molecules and electrons are 
very different types of systems, but there are aggregates of both which behave the same way. 
What this amounts to is that a state evolution function characterizes a system in a disembo-
died way, by not looking at the lower levels of aggregation. What is more, the concept of sub-
stance has no place in the description of systems. When we move down in the level of aggrega-
tion, we encounter subsystems for which the same principle holds: They are described in a 
disembodied way, and outside this description there is nothing relevant to say about them. 6 And 
there is no principled lower bound to the level of aggregation (if the money needed to do exper-
iments in high-energy physics is proportional to the energy required to do an experiment, then 
there is a pragmatical bottom line). But even if there were, the state evolution function of the 
smallest particle would still, in principle, be applicable to other systems -any other system, from 
international finance to problem solving to the solar system. Systems are peculiarly empty. The 
concept of substance is old-fashioned and has no place in modern science. 
We come to the conclusion that systems are empty, while we saw already that the world, 
as that which precedes explication, is empty as well. The ontological monism this leads.to is that 
reality, through which no explicit dividing line can be drawn so as to divide explicitly described 
systems from that from which explication starts, is empty. 7 
But this ontological monism is bound to an epistemological dualism. The second statement in 
the introduction to this chapter stated the conclusion of chapter 2, that explication is not expli-
citly describable. And section 4.1 ended with the remark that to every explicit description, there 
is always a context which can be made explicit, and when we try to explicate that context, there 
is more to explicated in the context of that description, etc. With the introduction of an explicit 
description in the situation, the hoi:izon shifts to open new possibilities. There is never an end to 
explication. Though reality is one, we can only describe part of it. What is unexplicable is not 
unreal: We just cannot describe it explicitly. 8 These conclusions bear well with each other: 
5. The principle of implementation-independence, central to engineering method. is thus closely connected 
to the concept of a state evolution function. This does not contradict my earlier statement that narural science 
does not follow the principle of implementation-independence. Natural science studies behavior as it is im-
plemented in nature, and this goal forbids using the principle of implementation-independence in natural sci-
ence research. But as pointed out earlier, that principle does have another use in natural science, as part of 
the justification of analogical reasoning. 
6. The description of nature as a collection of systems came into its own with Newton, who found a way to 
write down the state evolution function of continuous systems (as differential equations) and at the same time 
consolidated the experimental method. What was lacking in the constructivity in the mathematics he used. 
was thus made up for by the repeatable constructibility of his experiments independent of thepeculiarities of 
the person doing them. Dijksterhuis [1%1] describes the transition from medieaval to modern science as a 
transition from thinking in terms of substances to thinking in terms of behavior patterns and functions. I am 
not saying, of course, that Newton invented the language of systems theory (or discovered the experimental 
method all by himself), but I do think his achievement can be validly explicated as such. Cf. chapter 1 note 
2. 
7. This monism is inspired by, but not equal to, the Buddhist philosophy of emptiness: The highest reality is 
empty, but the realization that this is so is also the realization that the common cycle of life and death is emp-
ty. 
8. Compare this with Thomas Nagel's standpoint that various forms of reductionism are "motivated by an 
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What can be explicitly described are systems, not what precedes explicit description. When we 
attempt to describe what precedes it, we embark on a never-ending explication. 
The descriptions we talk about are expressions of knowledge. Science builds up knowledge 
expressed in explicit descriptions of systems, and in our everyday acting in the world we have 
unexpressed knowledge of the world which precedes explication. Apparently, there is a duality 
in knowledge, for explicit knowledge cannot have the unexplicated world as an object. When it 
attempts to describe it, the world retreats and we are left with just another system. On the other 
hand, working with explicit descriptions and the systems they describe creates an unexplicated 
context which is the source of inspiration of new discoveries in the search for explicit descrip-
tions of nature. This creates an inequality between explicit knowledge ·and knowledge which 
precedes explication. It is this inequality which I call epistemological dualism. 9 · 10 
Epistemological dualism is bound to ontological monism, for it is because of the dualism 
that we could not draw a clear and explicit line which divides reality into two. And it is because 
of our unexplicated familiarity with the world and our sensitivity for its horion that we know 
that there are two types of knowledge. 
It is interesting to see what this standpoint does to the traditional probems of mind/body duality. 
Haugeland [1981] neatly sums up these problems: 
(i) the metaphysical problem of mind interacting with matter; 
(ii) the theoretical problem of explaining the relevance of meanings, without appealing to a 
question-begging homunculus; and 
(iii) the methodological issue over the empirical testability (and hence, respectability) of "men-
talistic" explanations. ( p. 2) 11 
Problem 1 is no problem at all in as far as science studies just the behavior and state evolution 
of systems. The nature of the subsystems is immaterial to this study. Concepts like mind and 
body have no place in it. 
Problem 2 can be dealt with in the same manner: Explicitly described systems do not 
"have" meanings in the relevant sense and there is no state evolution function where any part of 
the state evolution must be explained by an appeal to meanings. If it had to be described in that 
way, it would not be a state evolution function. Like one network chatter on the Mod .ai net-
work (an international computer network devoted to discussions on AI) recently said, no com-
puter program has ever been debugged by using the concept of consciousness. 
It should be no surprise that problem 3 vanishes into thin air in the same way. State evolu-
tion functions describe the relation between input, output, and state evolution. By definition, 
systems behave observably (albeit sometimes in a very indirect way) or else they are not sys-
tems. 
epistemological criterion of reality -that only what can be understood in a certain way exists ... (Nagel [1986], 
p. 15) Elsewhere in the same book he calls it "scientism" (p. 9) and "physicalism" (p. 26). I would expli-
cate the epistemological criterion for reality as "only what can be explicitly described exists.'" 
9. The duality in knowledge is inspired by, but not equal to, the Buddhist philosophy of two truths. one ab-
solute, concerning the emptiness of things, the other relative, concerning the common cycle of daily activi-
ties. The philosophy of two truths is itself an example of relative truth. 
10. Harre [1970] also argues for a kind of epistemological dualism when he say; that neuropsychology can-
not classify brain states without the help of first-person reports about mental states of the subject ( pp. 209-
227). I or my close friends can report about my mental states (p. 222) and thus provide information about 
brain states which would not have been obtainable from the study of brain states alone. As a consequence. 
the subject is recruited to the scientific team (p. 224). The advance of explicit knowled,;L· of the brain re-
quires the use of implicit knowledge of the subject and, as I argue in Wieringa [ 1984], of the experimentor as 
well. This is a peculiarity of the study of mental functions. 
II. Having cleared the goal free of defenders, Haugeland then scores as follows: "The computational idea 
can be seen as slicing through all three dilemmas at a stroke; and this is what gives it. I think. the bulk of its 
tremendous gut-level appeal." Everybody clap your hands. 
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These answers say nothing more than that science should study mental behavior in the 
same way as it studies other behavior. But unlike the behavior of other systems, to human 
behavior belongs explication and this creates the research goal to describe explication explicitly. 
But explication is not explicitly describable. Hence, concepts like meaning creep in, which have 
a place in our everyday familiarity with the world, but which are not explicit and do not have a 
place in explicit descriptions. There is an intrusion of implicit, unexplicated knowledge into 
explicitly expressed knowledge which no cognitive scientist has yet been able to eliminate. 
According to epistemological dualism, this cannot be avoided. There is not one explicit 
description linking a concept like explication, which derives its meaning from the place it has in 
the world of unexplicated behavior of human beings, to concepts which derive their meaning 
solely from their role in the description of observable behavior and state evolution. Rather than 
attempt the impossible and try to eliminate ineliminable terms, it as well to accept this situation 
and investigate why these terms are ineliminable and in what way they occur in the descriptions. 
Fodor [1983] made an interesting observation which also leads to the conclusion that certain 
mental processes cannot be described in the language of science. He starts from the observation 
that higher mental processes are global, by which he means that anything can be relevant to 
them ( cf. the main reason why explication is not explicitly describable. Fodor uses a different 
argument, a supposed analogy between higher mental processes and scientific confirmation. 
Anything can be relevant to the confirmation of a scientific hypothesis, Fodor says, so by anal-
ogy anything can be relevant to higher mental processes. (Fodor op. cit. p. 105). From this he 
argues for what he calls "Fodor's First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science:" 
The more global a cognitive process is, the less anybody understands it. Very global 
processes, like analogical reasoning, aren't understood at all. (p. 107). 
According to Fodor, higher mental processes cannot be neatly encapsulated and studied in isola-
tion, but peripheral processes can, because these are reasonably modular. The greatest advances 
in neuroscience have been made in the study of the visual system, auditory system, motor sys-
tem etc. because these can be studied in isolation. What has been achieved is the "the ghost has 
been chased further back into the machine, but it has not been exorcised." (p. 127) According 
to Fodor, this is not accidentaly but necessarily so. 12 
This is in agreement with my conclusion that mental processes cannot be described in the 
language of state evolution functions. The distinction between systems describable by state evo-
lution functions and the rest of the wo~ld being vague and gradual, one would expect that 
advances can be made in an area where most processes are still of a kind which has proven to 
be amenable to description by state evolution, i.e. physiological processes such as the peripheral 
processes of the neurosystem. I would add, though, that the goal of exorcising the ghost from 
the machine is not realistic. It would be more fruitful to study the way how it is embodied in the 
machine -abandoning, of course, the goal of finding an explicit description of how it is embo-
died. 
4.3. Dualism between man and machine 
The dualism between explicit descriptions and the inexplicit world which explication starts from 
can be viewed from another angle. Explicitly described systems are machines, and industrial 
man is in the habit of making machines. In this section, I will draw some conclusions for 
engineering in general and computer science in particular. The conclusions I will draw are 
summed up in the following quotation from Winograd [1981]. 
A person writing a program (or contributing it its "knowledge base") does so within a back-
ground of assumptions about how the program will be u~ed and who will be interpreting its 
12. See chapter 2, note 6. 
r 
j' 
" 
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responses. Part of this can be made explicit in documentation, but part is an implicit back-
ground of what can be "normally understood." Except for systems operating within highly con-
strained domains, there inevitably comes a time when the system "breaks down" because it is 
being used in a way that does not fit the assumptions . 
There is always a limit set by what has been made explicit, and always the potential 
of breakdowns that call for moving beyond this limit. (Winograd [1981] pp. 258-259) 
To which I am inclined to add, "etcetera." If the cause of the breakdown has been located and 
made explicit, a procedure for handling it can be added to the explicit description. The remark 
made by Winograd then applies to this new description, etc. In an important sense, the back-
ground is infinite while our explicit descriptions are finite. The "implicit background of what 
can be 'normally understood'" is Heidegger's world. 13 
Winograd & Flores [1986] point out an aspect of Heidegger's early philosophy which is 
relevant to the mechanization of intelligence. Tools -useful artefacts- are at hand (Zuhanden) 
without the user directing his or her attention at them. Attention of the user is directed at a goal, 
which lies in a different domain altogether from the domain which the manufacturer of the tool 
lives in. For the user, tools are "just there," subject to an implicit web of meanings, and they 
only appear explicitly in the domain of the user when they malfunction (Winograd & Flores 
[1986] p. 36, Heidegger [1927] p. 74, 361). The implicit world we live in is only explicated 
when needed, i.e. when the web of what is normal and expected is ruptured. 
This has a number of consequences. First, computer programmers rarely realize that the 
users of their programs are not interested in the sources of errors in a program. When a pro-
gram is used, the user is directed at one domain, but when the program, breaks down, a com-
pletely different domain emerges. These two domains may be so unrelated as political history 
and Pascal programming, if the user wrote a paper on political history and the word processor is 
written in Pascal. Most people find such an abrupt and unwanted change of domain unpleasant. 
To a programmer using the word processor for a programming-related task, on the other hand, 
the change i~ not nearly as abrupt. The implicit web of meanings he dwelled in at the moment 
of breakdown concerned programming already. He may very well be interested in the source of 
the breakdown and talk it over with the writer of the word processing program. Programmers 
are not exposed to the abrupt and unpleasant change of domain which user outside the domain 
of computer science are exposed to, and this can create a source for misunderstanding and frus-
trated communication. 
A second consequence is that a program, which is an explicitly described process which 
functions on unspoken assumptions about its use, is bound to break down when these assump-
tions are violated. Given this fact, it is better to make the user aware of these limitations than to 
create the illusion that these limitations are not there, such as all too often is the habbit in 
presentations of AI programs (see McDermott [1976]). 
A third consequence follows from the second but is more general, because not limited to 
computers. Because machines are explicitly described, their use is explicitly described (or at 
least, the range of uses within which the manufacturer can guarantee proper functioning us 
explicitly described). In general, the user must be aware of the limits of possible use. But the 
user is always (possibly via a chain of intermediate machines) a human being, so whenever in 
an organization a function is mechanized, it is man who must adapt himself to the behavior of 
the machine. This need not be dramatic at all. For example, it may be an adaption which is 
required by a needed reorganization anyway,- or the machine may relieve the human being from 
a lot of work, or it may be designed in a very user-friendly manner. But even in such idyllic 
situations the limits of the machine are determined by its explicit description and it is man who 
must adjust himself, thus introducing some rigidity -context-independence, repeatability- in the 
behavior of the users of the machines. This is independent of the degree of user-friendliness 
13. Which. by implication. is infinite. 
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built into the machine. It may be experienced as unpleasant by the U§ers, regardless the user-
friendliness of the machine. 
A final point to be made about the use of machines does not follow from the properties of 
breakdown but from their context-independence (which is also the source of rigid breakdown 
patterns). The output of a machine is defined in terms of inputs and state sequences but is inter-
preted by the user in a context of purposes, unspoken assumptions, and interests. To put it in 
the language of section 4.1, for every explicit description there is an unexplicated metalevel. To 
assume that a machine shares this context or metalevel is to misunderstand the nature of 
machines. Winograd & Flores [1986] explain this elaborately in the case of computers. There is 
an endless number of examples of this in the realm of engineering within as well as outside 
computer science. Kent [1978] gives many examples in the area of computer science. The exam-
ples all illustrate the simple point that 
When a data file exists to serve just one application, there is in effect just one context, and 
users implicitly understand that context; they automatically resolve ambiguities by interpreting 
words as appropriate for that context. But when files get integrated into a data base serving 
multiple applications, that ambiguity-resolving mechanism is lost. The assumptions appropriate 
to the context of one application may not fit the contexts of other applications. (Kent [1978], p. 
3) 
It is as simple as that, but the consequences are momentuous. In the worst case, the integration 
of two files used in different contexts is useless to all parties concerned. 
Outside the realm of computers, a neat example of the importance of the shifts in the con-
text created and perceived by human beings is given by Ottevangers [1986]: In a certain area, a 
waterpurification installation is built with a capacity sufficient for current and future water 
needs. To finance the installation, a small tax is levied. Because of this tax, local companies 
find it profitable to purify their water themselves, so that they don't have to pay the levy. The 
result is an installation wich is much too large for the remaining community of users and which 
cannot be financed out of the taxes which this community raises. What has happened is that 
human users perceived this machine in a context, explicated _a profitable alternative and fol-
lowed that up. Out of nothing, a way is found to circumvent the use of a machine altogether. A 
bit less extreme is the creativity human user always seem to be able to muster in finding unex-
pected ways to use machines. E.g., access registration, time c;vcks and other little machines to 
get a handle on what is really happening in an organization are used in such a way that the 
employee constructs a favorable profile of himself in the database into which data from all these 
machines is poured. All of these examples can be understood to be ineliminable by keeping the 
gap between context-independence of mechanical processes and the context-sensitivity of human 
intelligence in mind (this is relevant if we consider, say, the attempts of governments to elim-
inate tax-frauds, a part of the informal section of society, by automated information processing, 
which is an application of explicit descriptions. Instead of eliminating tax-frauds we may end up 
with increased control over a large part of society which followed the rules anyway.) 
I cannot resist closing this chapter by quoting from the former president of the Interna-
tional Federation of Information Processing, Zemanek. 
Today very frequently the gap between formal and informal universes is overlooked, 
neglected, ignored. Formal thinking is applied to relations which would require informal 
understanding and formal structures are very sloppily described in an inadequate and mislead-
ing natural language ... We deal with the individual and with society sometimes as if they were 
constructs, but at the same time we let technology grow into the natural environment without 
planning and control. (Zemanek [1972], pp 138, 136) 
The idea that machine intelligence is possible is at the center of the confusion deplored by 
Zemanek. 
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Chapter 5 
Summary and conclusion 
5.1. Summary 
1. Explicit descriptions are communicable to a group of people of arbitrary size. Any one 
member of this group can, barring practical limitations of time, space, money, required 
background knowledge, etc., show his understanding of the description by applying it to 
the described state or process. Understandability by an arbitrary group of people presup-
poses that the process or state description is repeatable, i.e. whenever the initial conditions 
occur, the process develops as specified by the process description and whenever the con-
ditions in the state description occur, the state is present. This in turn implies that the 
description is context-independent, i.e. all relevant elements of the context are stated in the 
description and whatever is not stated is not relevant. 
2. A machine is a system with a state transition or evolution function. The behavior, 
processes and states of a machine are explicitly described. This includes, of course, Turing 
machines, for they execute communicable, repeatable and context-independent descriptions 
by definition. But it includes also any natural system of which we know the state transition 
or state evolution function, like the solar system or a falling rock. And it includes any 
artificial system which is constructed according to an explicit description, like radios, cars 
and telephones. There are also natural and artificial systems of which we currently do not 
know an explicit description at an interesting level of abstraction (or detail), such as the 
weather, two people talking to each other, the !Kung bushmen fire dance, and quarks. 
3. Explication is a process which produces an explicit description of a state or process 
without receiving an equivalent description as input. The ability to explicate is the ability 
to produce an explicit description of a range of states and/or processes which is not expli-
citly described in advance of explication. Individual cases of explication can succeed to a 
greater or lesser degree, and human beings differ in their capability to explicate well. But 
the ability to explicate a variety of states and processes which is not circumscribed expli-
citly in advance is part of human intelligence. In contrast, by definition the range of situa-
tions a machine can produce explicit descriptions of is explicitly demarcated in advance of 
the production of explicit descriptions by the machine. 
4. Moreover, particular instances of explication by human intelligence cannot be explicitly 
described either, because 1. the intitial phase of explication is one, if not the, most incom-
municable process occuring in human intelligence; and since 2. anything in the environ-
ment can be relevant for the explication, it cannot be described in a finite, context-
independent way; and because 3. anything in the history of the persons who do the expli-
cating can be relevant to the outcome of the process, repeated occurences cannot in gen-
eral be captured by a finite description. 
5. 
5.1. In a discussion of related viewpoints, Turing's arguments for the possibility of MI 
turn out to be particularly weak, for almost exclusively in the defensive (of the type 
"How could it be otherwise"). His only positive argument, the possibility of a learn-
ing machine, begs the question. His argument would gain in plausibility if some rea-
son would be given to believe that the resulting artifact would be a machine, i.e. 
explicitly describable, but he does not give us any. 
5.2. Arguments revolving about "semantic information processing" conflate "representa-
tional content" with "interpretation" in the standard predicate logic sense and lead to 
the assumption of a homunculus in human mental processes. The need for a homun-
culus is not obviated by appeal to the automatic nature of .;;orne computational 
processes, for what is at issue is whether the relevant computational processes, those 
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simulating higher mental functions, exist at all, i.e. whethef"' the relevant mental 
processes are explicitly describable. Cognitive science and AI, like Turing, issue a 
promissory note that they are, but have offered nothing in support of this claim. My 
argument that the note is void therefore stands unaffected. 
5.3. Searle formulates a crucial assumption of AI research, the implementation-
independence of mental processes. He formulates an interesting counterclaim, that of 
implementation-dependence of mental processes on the brain. A presupposition which 
must be satisfied for both claims to have a truth-value is that mental processes and 
brain processes are explicitly describable. Since I argue that at least one mental pro-
cess is not explicitly describable, it follows that both claims are meaningless for at 
least that process. 
5.4. My argument can be construed as a support for Jefferson's claim that machines can-
not think and as a cleaned-up version of one of the arguments which appear in 
Dreyfus [1979]. Whereas Dreyfus concentrates in that particular argument on perspi-
cuous grouping, I concentrate on explication and therefore am able to base my argu-
ment on a rather uncontroversial definition of machines. Dreyfus' argument, by con-
trast, is limited to computers. 
6. Explication is inspired by what Heidegger calls alternatively "world" or "nothingness," the 
unexplicated reality which we pre-reflectively dwell in. Explicit descriptions describe sys-
tems, and the concept of system can be viewed as an explication of the very general con-
cept of entity or thing. The world is not the totality of things, but precedes things, and is 
therefore aptly called no-thing. On the other hand, systems are described in an essentially 
disembodied way by state evolution functions, which concentrate on behavior and states, 
not on what subsystems a given system is composed of. Ontological monism says that 1. 
there is no sharp dividing line between the world from which explication starts and the col-
lection of systems described by the result of explication, and that 2. the reality at both ends 
of this scale is empty. 
7. Ontological monism goes with epistemological dualism, for the knowledge which we, as 
executors of the explication process, have of what stands at both ends of the gradual scale 
of explication, is itself not explicitly describable. Explicit descriptions are limited to the 
outcome of the explication process. Explicitly expresse9 knowledge has its limits just as 
implicit knowledge has, and the two are clearly distinguishable. Because the world is not a 
thing, it is not explicitly describable, and moreover the context of every explicit descrip-
tion is an unexplicated world. To every explicit description there is always an unexplicated 
metalevel which contains pointers beyond the horizon of the current situation. 
8. In the study of inanimate nature, all relevant domain knowledge has always been expressi-
ble in explicit description, but in the study of higher mental processes, concepts drawn 
from our pre-scientific experience as intelligent beings invariably crop up. The argument 
of this paper implies that this is necessarily so, for some higher mental processes are not 
explicitly describable; knowledge of them will always contain a literally inexplicable com-
ponent. 
9. In the construction of useful artifacts -tools-, the possible uses within which proper func-
tioning can be guaranteed are sharply circumscribed. Rather than suggest that there are no 
sharp boundaries, as is the habbit in AI research, the user should be made aware of these 
limits. The introduction of machines in an organization inevitably introduces some rigidity 
in the way human beings must deal with the machine, and the desirability of this rigidity 
must be weighed against the considerations which motivated the introduction of the 
machine. Moreover, since the unexplicated context in which the machine functions is 
changed by the introduction of the machine, and because this context is accessible to man 
but not to the machine, automation can have quite unexpected and undesirable conse-
quences which all have to do with the creative way in which man perceives the introduced 
machine in a context. 
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5.2. Conclusion 
Patrick Winston, head of the Walhalla of AI technology, the MIT AI lab, says in his popular 
textbook on AI that 
As soon as a process is dissected, studied, grasped, the intelligence invariably seems to vanish 
... Vintage performance becomes vin ordinaire once details are exposed and limitations are 
seen. One must recognize this natural tendency or it will lead to a poor attitude. (Winston 
[1977], p. 254) 
The foregoing chapters give support for this claim and investigate some aspects of the poor atti-
tude which results from ignoring it. The arguments to support the claim are not a proof, and it 
is essential for them that they are not. If they were, they could be au to mated. In this respect 
they are not unlike the medieaval existence proofs of God, which were designed not so much to 
convince unbelievers as to explicate what believers knew. 1 The faith supported by these argu-
ments is, precisely, that what it is for a human being to exist in a world can never be exhaus-
tively verbalized. Man's capacity for language raises him above other animals, but the new 
medium immediately makes him aware of its finiteness, i.e. of the distance between verbaliza-
tions and what is verbalized. What is worse, the finiteness cannot be exhaustively verbalized. 
That does not mean that we should stop talking. On the contrary, it is that finiteness which 
keeps us talking. 
I have tried to argue my thesis across the boundaries of the two cultures of computer sci-
ence and philosophy (and, within philosophy, accross the boundaries of the block-headed hard-
liners and the romantic nitwits). The ·Zen question, asked while the master raises his stick, 
"What was your face before you were born? Answer quickly!" can be translated into the post-
industrial question "What is left of this thesis after the solar system has burnt up? Motivate your 
answer." asked while there is only 5 minutes left in the exam. At least, this thesis has contri-
buted to the heat which, according to the second law of thermodynamics, will be all that is left 
over. 
I. Cf. St. Anselm's remark in the Proslogion, written about 1077-1078: "Consequently. I have written the lit-
tle work that follows, dealing with this and one or two other matters. in the role of unc who strives to raise 
his mind to the contemplation of God and seeks to understand what he believes." Anselm (1957]. p. 391. 
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